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In a set of six experiments, the relation between metacognition and associative memory 
was explored. The purpose was to determine whether the metacognitive behaviors that are used 
with item memory are also used with associative memory. Different memory systems have 
separate underlying processes which can cause mnemonic strategies to only be useful for some 
types of memory. People use metacognition to monitor and control their memory; however, it is 
uncertain whether metacognitive monitoring and control are the same for different types of 
memory. The research presented in this dissertation demonstrates the similarities and differences 
between metacognitive behavior for item and associative memory. 
In the first three experiments, presented in Chapter 2, several metamemory measures 
were explored including: Judgments of Learning (JOLs), Confidence Judgments (CJs), study 
time allocation, and response latencies. Each experiment used a different set of stimuli that are 
known to have different effects on associative recognition memory, this provided an opportunity 
to observe the outcome of the metacognitive measures under unique conditions. First, related and 
unrelated word pairs were recognized equally well, however related pairs had higher hit rates and 
higher false alarm rates compared to unrelated pairs. Participants allocated less study time to 
related word pairs because they were more confident in their ability to remember them than 
unrelated word pairs. Second, concrete word pairs had better discriminability, higher hit rates, 
but lower false alarm rates than abstract word pairs. Therefore, concreteness facilitated 
associative recognition memory, however participants showed no difference in confidence or 
study time allocation for concrete and abstract word pairs. Third, picture pairs had better 
discriminability, higher hit rates, but lower false alarm rates than unrelated word pairs. Similar to 





Despite the benefits of pictures and concreteness, participants showed no difference in 
confidence for these types of stimuli which is theorized to be a result of differences in 
metacognitive beliefs. Unlike previous findings which showed that concreteness is believed to 
facilitate item memory, this belief does not apply to associative memory. 
In the second set of three experiments, presented in Chapter 3, procedural changes were 
made to facilitate study behavior. There were no changes in study behavior even after 
participants gained experience with the experimental procedure. Similarly, they did not 
incorporate the corrective feedback that they were given on their responses during the memory 
test into their study strategies. Lastly, JOLs for concrete word pairs were more accurate when 
they were collected after a short delay rather than immediately after each study pair. These 
experiments demonstrate a consistent pattern of study behavior that is difficult to change without 
explicit intervention. However, the finding that delaying the time when JOLs were collected had 
a positive effect on their accuracy suggests that useful strategies that have been found for item 
memory can similarly be useful for associative memory. 
 
Keywords: metacognition, associative memory, recognition, judgments of learning,  







TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………….i 
Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………………iii 
List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………………viii 
List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………….…….x 
Chapter 1…………………………………………………………………………………………..1 
Metamemory measures……………………………………………………………………………6 
     Judgments of Learning…………………………………………………………………………6 
     Confidence Judgments………………………………………………………………………..10 
     Reaction Time Measures……………………………………………………………………...11 
Associative Memory...……………………………………………………………………….......13 
Associative Recognition Memory from a Metacognitive Perspective….……………………….16 




     Participants……………………………………………………………………………………24 
     Materials……………………………………………………………………………………...25 
     Procedure……………………………………………………………………………………..25 
Results……………………………………………………………………………………………27 
     Recognition performance……………………………………………………………………..27 
     Metacognitive measures………………………………………………………………………30 





          Test………………………………………………………………………………………...31 




     Participants……………………………………………………………………………………35 
     Materials……………………………………………………………………………………...35 
     Procedure……………………………………………………………………………………..36 
Results……………………………………………………………………………………………36 
     Recognition performance……………………………………………………………………..36 
     Metacognitive measures………………………………………………………………………38 
          Study………………………………………………………………………………………39 
          Test………………………………………………………………………………………...39 




     Participants……………………………………………………………………………………43 
     Materials……………………………………………………………………………………...44 
     Procedure……………………………………………………………………………………..44 
Results……………………………………………………………………………………………44 
     Recognition performance……………………………………………………………………..44 





          Study………………………………………………………………………………………47 
          Test………………………………………………………………………………………...47 






     Participants……………………………………………………………………………………60 
     Materials……………………………………………………………………………………...60 
     Procedure……………………………………………………………………………………..60 
Results……………………………………………………………………………………………62 
     Recognition performance……………………………………………………………………..62 
     Metacognitive measures………………………………………………………………………65 
          Study………………………………………………………………………………………65 
          Test………………………………………………………………………………………...66 




     Participants……………………………………………………………………………………71 
     Materials……………………………………………………………………………………...72 






     Recognition performance……………………………………………………………………..72 
     Metacognitive measures………………………………………………………………………74 
          Study………………………………………………………………………………………74 
          Test………………………………………………………………………………………...75 




     Participants……………………………………………………………………………………79 
     Materials……………………………………………………………………………………...79 
     Procedure……………………………………………………………………………………..80 
Results……………………………………………………………………………………………80 
     Recognition performance……………………………………………………………………..80 
     Metacognitive measures………………………………………………………………………83 
          Study………………………………………………………………………………………83 
          Test………………………………………………………………………………………...83 










     Confidence Judgments………………………………………………………………………..97 
     Reaction Time Measures...…………………………………………………………………..100 
Associative Recognition Memory from a Metacognitive Perspective…………………………102 










LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Associative Recognition Performance Measures 
by Pair Type for Experiment 1…...………………………………………………………………28 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures (Mean JOLs and Study 
Time in sec.) by Pair Type for Experiment 1…………………………………………………….30 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for metacognitive measures at test (mean CJs and 
Response Time in sec) by Pair Type and Probe Type for Experiment 1………………………...31 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Associative Recognition Performance Measures 
by Pair Type for Experiment 2…………………………………………………………………...37 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures (Mean JOLs and Study 
Time in sec) by Pair Type for Experiment 2……………………………………………………..39 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures at Test (Mean CJs and 
Response Time in sec) by Pair Type and Probe Type for Experiment 2………………………...40 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Associative Recognition Performance Measures 
by Pair Type for Experiment 3…………………………………………………………………...45 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures (Mean JOLs and Study 
Time in sec) by Pair Type for Experiment 3……………………………………………………..47 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures at Test (Mean CJs and 
Response Time in sec) by Pair Type and Probe Type for Experiment 3………………………...48 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for Associative Recognition Performance Measures 
by Pair Type for Experiment 4…………………………………………………………………...63 
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures (Mean JOLs and 





Table 12: Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures at Test (Mean CJs and 
Response Time in sec.) by Pair Type and Probe Type for Experiment 4………………………..67 
Table 13: Descriptive Statistics for Associative Recognition Performance Measures 
by Pair Type for Experiment 5…………………………………………………………………...73 
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures (Mean JOLs and Study 
Time in sec) by Pair Type for Experiment 5……………………………………………………..75 
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures at Test (mean CJs and 
Response Time in sec) by Pair Type and Probe Type for Experiment 5………………………...76 
Table 16: Descriptive Statistics for Associative Recognition Performance Measures 
by Pair Type for Experiment 6…………………………………………………………………...81 
Table 17: Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures (Mean JOLs and Study 
Time in sec) by Pair Type for Experiment 6……………………………………………………..83 
Table 18: Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures at Test (Mean CJs and 






LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Framework for Metacognition…………………………………………………………..4 
Figure 2: Cue-utilization Approach to Metacognitive Judgments………………………………...5 
Figure 3: Mean Hits and False Alarms for Each Pair Type in Experiment 1……………………29 
Figure 4: Mean Hits and False Alarms for Each Pair Type in Experiment 2……………………38 
Figure 5: Mean Hits and False Alarms for Each Pair Type in Experiment 3……………………46 
Figure 6: Mean Hits and False Alarms for Each Pair Type and Block in Experiment 4………...64 
Figure 7: Mean Hits and False Alarms for Each Pair Type and Block in Experiment 5………...74 





Chapter 1: General Introduction 
The concept of introspection has been discussed by psychologists and philosophers for 
many years. Introspection is the act of self-reflection on internal processes, such as thoughts, 
emotions, or beliefs (www.merriam-webster.com). It can be performed for something as simple 
as recalling the location of misplaced car keys to something as complex as evaluating your core 
values and beliefs. It is also essential for keeping current knowledge updated. Metacognition is 
an area of cognitive research that is based on the idea of introspection. Colloquially, 
metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. Essentially, there is a higher order 
process involved when someone reflects on their own cognitive behavior. Since the late 70’s, 
metacognitive research has expanded to cover many areas of human behavior, for instance child 
development (Hughes et al., 2018), teaching (Dunlosky et al., 2013), and memory (Kornell & 
Bjork, 2009). The majority of the metacognitive literature has been focused on human memory, 
however there is a gap concerning associative recognition memory. The main purpose of this 
dissertation was to examine the relation between metacognition and associative recognition 
memory. 
 When Flavell (1979) first coined the term metacognition his goal was to introduce a 
concept that could explain how children learn from prior knowledge and previous experiences. 
While working with children he noticed that they differed in their ability to reflect on their own 
learning, where some children could explain why they gave a certain response on a task while 
others could not. Flavell separated metacognitive behavior into two main components: 
knowledge and experiences. Metacognitive knowledge, which contains the subcomponents task, 
person, and strategy, affects decision making depending on the situation. For example, 





personal beliefs about their own capabilities, which can have a positive or negative influence on 
their behavior. Knowledge of different types also interact to have a combined effect on decision 
making. Metacognitive experiences refer to past experiences with previous goals and actions. 
These experiences can have many different effects, such as shaping strategy use, changing 
metacognitive knowledge, or directing current actions or knowledge. Flavell suggested that 
metacognitive experiences are often relied upon when a particular task has a high cognitive 
demand (e.g., when planning is involved). These concepts remain important for research on child 
development and learning (e.g., Mokharti & Reichard, 2002), and provide a general idea of how 
metacognitive behavior can affect learning. 
 Interest in research on metacognition increased considerably in the 90’s, particularly 
regarding memory. The subcategory of metacognition, referred to as metamemory, was unified 
with the framework proposed by Nelson and Narens (1990). The main purpose of their 
framework was to explain the role of metacognition within the generally well-established 
memory model. According to their framework cognitive behavior works on a meta-level and an 
object-level, where the meta-level is a dynamic model of the object-level. The levels interact by 
two mechanisms: monitoring and control. Monitoring involves changes in the dynamic model of 
the meta-level based on assessment of the object-level, this is often examined by self-reported 
judgments of one’s own behavior. Control refers to changes in the object-level based on 
feedback from the meta-level, this involves initiating an action, continuing an action, or 
terminating an action. 
 Within the center of their model lies the object-level which in this case is the memory 
model: an acquisition stage, a retention stage, and a retrieval stage (see Figure 1). Each of these 





For example, the acquisition stage is when the characteristics of the to-be-learned material are 
assessed on qualities like item difficulty. As another example, the retrieval stage is when a 
response may be assessed on how likely it is to be correct. The framework was able to categorize 
existing research on previously established metacognitive measures such as Ease-of-Learning 
(EOLs)1 judgments, Judgments of Learning (JOLs), and study time allocation, and place them 
into either a control or a monitoring role. For instance, EOLs are a self-report measure of how 
difficult an item will be to learn (Leonesio & Nelson, 1990; Underwood, 1966). EOLs assess 
metacognitive monitoring because they provide information to the dynamic model at the meta-
level based on the state of learning. Alternatively, allocation of study time is a metacognitive 
control process because it produces a plan for study behavior based on the current meta-level 
model (Nelson & Leonesio, 1988). The Nelson and Narens’ (1990) framework has been a guide 
for metacognitive research that followed because researchers have focused on exploring the 
concepts of monitoring and control and the various metacognitive measures that fall within each 
















Framework for Metacognition 
 
Note. A framework for metacognition, where the object-level includes the three stages of 
memory (acquisition, retention, and retrieval) and the meta-level includes the monitoring (top) 
and control (bottom) mechanisms. Adapted from Nelson and Narens (1990). 
 
 The Nelson and Narens’ (1990) framework has been important in unifying the different 
aspects of metacognition; however, it has a broad scope that covers the entirety of metamemory. 
At a more specific level metacognitive researchers are interested in how people make judgments 
and how they maintain control over their learning. The most popular approach for explaining 
how people form metacognitive judgments was introduced by Asher Koriat in 1997 and was 
centered on cue-utilization. The cue-utilization approach was based on previous findings on 
JOLs, which are judgments made after some material has been studied and are an assessment of 
how well that material will be remembered in the future (Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969). According 
to the cue-utilization approach, “JOLs are based on the implicit application of rules or heuristics 










































will be recalled or recognized at some later time” (Koriat, 1997, p. 350). These rules or heuristics 
are based on cues that can be categorized into three different types: intrinsic, extrinsic, and 
mnemonic (see Figure 2). Intrinsic cues are derived from the characteristics of the study material. 
Extrinsic cues are from the conditions of the learning environment or the encoding strategy of 
the learner. Mnemonic cues are internal subjective indicators, such as beliefs on how memory 
works. One important distinction between these types of cues is that intrinsic and extrinsic cues 
are made from analytic inferences, while mnemonic cues are made from nonanalytic, implicit 
inferences. Regardless of how cues are categorized, the metacognitive field has continued to 
place an emphasis on the importance of cues when making any type of metacognitive judgment. 
Current research on metacognitive judgments is focused on the accuracy and usefulness of cues 
in relation to the behavioral outcome being measured (e.g., the accuracy of JOLs at predicting 
memory performance on a recall test). 
Figure 2 
Cue-utilization Approach to Metacognitive Judgments 
 
Note. Two types of cues (Intrinsic and Extrinsic) are made based on an analytical approach, 
while the third type of cue (Mnemonic) is a based on an experiential, nonanalytical approach and 
is typically used after intrinsic or extrinsic cues have already been considered. Adapted from 
Koriat (1997). 
 
 Analytical inference 







 Over the last few decades of research on metacognitive judgments it has been found that 
the interaction between cues and judgments varies under different conditions. The next section 
will review the three types of metacognitive measures that are relevant to the research presented 
in this dissertation. 
Metamemory Measures 
 There are many different types of judgments that have been examined throughout the 
metamemory literature that each covers a specific aspect of memory. This section will focus on 
the following three measures: JOLs, CJs, and reaction time. All the experiments presented in this 
dissertation included all three of these measures; each one captures metacognitive behavior at 
different time points and in different ways. JOLs were recorded during study and are self-
assessments of ongoing learning. CJs were recorded during test and are self-assessments of 
memory accuracy. Reaction time was recorded throughout the entire procedure and is an implicit 
measure of behavior. In the following subsections each measure will be reviewed in terms of key 
findings, important cues, and influence on memory. 
Judgments of Learning 
JOLs were one of the earliest metacognitive measures introduced and have remained one 
of the most popular measures used in metacognitive research (Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969). An 
example of a JOL prompt would be, “How confident are you that you will remember the item 
you just studied at a later time?” Subjects would then indicate a rating, typically on a 0-100 scale 
(sometimes with 20-point increments), where a higher rating indicates greater confidence. JOLs 
are often collected after the subject has completed a single trial – these are referred to as item-
level or immediate JOLs. Arbuckle and Cuddy (1969) indirectly introduced JOLs when they 





relatedness in word pairs. They were the first to ask participants to rate their likelihood of 
remembering pairs of items using a 1-7 point scale, where a higher rating indicated greater 
confidence in the likelihood of remembering a pair. Since then, JOLs have been similarly used to 
investigate whether people can detect other differences between stimuli.  
In general, JOLs have been shown to be highly sensitive to stimulus manipulations. The 
memory literature has a long history of examining the conditions in which the characteristics of 
stimuli affect memory performance. One example of this is word frequency (WF), which refers 
to how often a word is used or seen throughout language use. A common finding in the memory 
literature is that low frequency words are recognized more easily than high frequency words 
(Glanzer & Adams, 1985). WF has not been investigated nearly as much in the metacognitive 
literature, however a meta-analysis found a small but reliable effect of WF on JOLs (Fiacconi & 
Dollois, 2020), where JOLs for high frequency words were more accurate than JOLs for low 
frequency words. Studies included in the analysis contained either recognition or recall test 
formats. They observed a large variance in effect sizes between studies, indicating that there are 
likely other factors contributing to this WF effect. More research is needed on the WF effect on 
JOLs; however, these initial reports serve as an example to demonstrate that JOLs have a reliable 
sensitivity to differences in stimuli. 
 Another example of a stimulus characteristic that has been extensively studied in the 
memory literature is concreteness. It has been repeatedly shown that concrete words are 
remembered better than abstract words (e.g., Hockley & Cristi, 1996; Paivio & Csapo, 1969). 
Likewise, a consistent concreteness effect has been found in JOLs, where concrete words are 
given higher JOLs than abstract words (Begg et al., 1989). This effect is a result of 





When Witherby and Tauber (2017) had participants estimate the likelihood of remembering 
concrete or abstract words in a hypothetical experiment, participants predicted that more 
concrete words would be remembered than abstract words. Thus, in the absence of any actual 
influence of concreteness on learning participants had a belief that concreteness benefits 
memory. Additionally, in a follow up experiment when participants were asked to give pre-study 
JOLs (collected before each word was studied) or immediate JOLs (collected after each word 
was studied) they gave higher JOLs to concrete words than abstract words. Both experiments 
support the idea that when participants notice differences in stimulus characteristics, they either 
have an existing belief on how that difference will affect their ability to remember the stimuli or 
they form a belief on how it will impact their memory. 
 The last instance of word characteristics affecting memory performance that will be 
reviewed here briefly is the associative strength, or relatedness, between word pairs. Up until this 
point, the emphasis has been on differences inherit in the characteristics of single words, 
however, one of the primary goals of the current dissertation was to examine metamemory for 
word pairs. In a set of experiments, Undorf and Erdfelder (2015) found that highly related word 
pairs (month-year) were given higher JOLs compared to unrelated words pairs (bus-score). Also, 
related pairs were studied for a less amount of time, took less study-test trials before being 
successfully recalled, and overall were recalled more than unrelated pairs. This study serves as 
an introduction to the idea that the association between word pairs, which has a long history in 
the memory literature, has effects on metamemory as well. 
The basis of metacognitive judgments, like JOLs, are typically explained by the cue-
utilization approach. However, Mueller, Dunlosky, and Tauber (2016) proposed an addition to 





(AP) theory. According to AP theory people take a problem-solving approach when making 
judgments, where cues are subject to personal beliefs on how they affect memory performance. 
This theory has been supported by research on metacognitive illusions. One such illusion is that 
identical paired items (cow-cow) are better recalled than related (pasture-cow) or unrelated pairs 
(ace-cow). Mueller et al., (2016) found that identical paired items had greater JOLs than related 
pairs, but they did not differ in actual cued recall. More importantly in terms of AP theory is that 
the relation between JOLs and recall was not mediated by processing fluency. 
Processing fluency refers to the ease of which an item is processed when it is studied. 
One way processing fluency has been measured is by study time, where less study time indicates 
faster processing. Study time and JOLs have been shown to be negatively related, where lower 
study time is accompanied by higher JOLs. This relation has typically led to the conclusion that 
processing fluency is used as a cue for making metacognitive judgments. However, as Mueller 
and his colleagues (2016) found, processing fluency did not mediate the relation between JOLs 
and recall performance. In fact, they found in a previous study that when participants were asked 
to judge a hypothetical situation where identical pairs and related pairs were studied, they still 
gave higher JOLs to identical pairs demonstrating that in the absence of the effects of processing 
fluency this illusion still remained (Mueller, Tauber, & Dunlosky, 2013). When participants were 
asked to provide a reason for their judgments, they indicated a belief that identical pairs are 
easier to remember and that the repetition of the same word in an identical pair would also make 
them easier to remember. 
While AP theory does well to explain how cues can be used in the absence of the effect 
of factors, like processing fluency, there are still many other examples where processing fluency 





and Castel (2008) who demonstrated the font size illusion, where words in larger font were given 
higher JOLs than words in smaller font but font size had no effect on the number of words 
recalled. Others measures of processing fluency, like study time (Undorf & Erdfelder, 2015) and 
trials to acquisition (Witherby & Tauber, 2017), have also been used to determine if there are any 
mediation effects. The results have been mixed, for example Undorf and Erdfelder (2015) found 
that self-paced study time was a mediating factor for the effect of relatedness on JOLs. In 
contrast, Witherby and Tauber (2017) found no mediating effect of self-paced study on the effect 
of concreteness on JOLs. It remains unclear what role processing fluency has on people’s 
decision making when it comes to metacognitive judgments or how it may interact with other 
potential cues.  
Confidence Judgments 
 The second type of metacognitive measure that will be reviewed is confidence 
judgments. These are also referred to as Retroactive Confidence Judgments (RCJs) because they 
involve a person assessing past responses on a memory test. A general CJ prompt would be, 
“How confident are you that your response was correct?” Typically, they are collected using a 0-
10 scale, with a higher score indicating greater confidence. In terms of the Nelson and Narens’ 
(1990) framework, CJs are a measure of memory retrieval, specifically the output of response. 
Therefore, the information available to a person making a CJ will be different than someone 
making a JOL. The literature on CJs has investigated the factors that affect people’s ratings. 
A finding from early studies (e.g., Costermans et al., 1992), that has been replicated 
numerous times, is that CJs are often moderate to highly accurate. Compared to a similar 
judgment like Feeling-of-Knowing (FOK), where participants are asked to make a judgment on 





correlated to accuracy (Siedlecka et al., 2019). Both judgments are prompted during test and 
after making a response to an item, but FOKs are only made when information is not available 
whereas CJs are made regardless of whether a response was correct or not. This difference in 
available information allows people to make accurate CJs but not FOKs. 
 From a cue-utilization perspective, CJs can be made using different cues than those 
available to other metacognitive measures like JOLs or FOKs. One such cue, which is highly 
predictive of correctness on a recall memory test is retrieval processing or fluency (Siedlecka et 
al., 2019). This refers to the ability to retrieve the memory trace of a studied item as well as the 
speed with which the response comes to mind. The high accuracy of CJs can be more useful than 
other metacognitive measures for learning strategies like selecting items for re-study (Robey et 
al., 2017). Judgments like FOKs which are made at the time when recall of the correct response 
is not available are made based on partial accessibility to the response or the cue fluency (Chua 
& Solinger, 2015). 
Reaction Time Measures 
 One alternative measure to judgments, which is not exclusive to metacognition, is 
reaction time. Typically, reaction time measures are collected in conjunction with other 
measures, such as JOLs, to compare explicit responses to implicit behavior. For example, 
research interested in how people decide how long to study different items will compare 
judgments of item difficulty to the length of study time per item in order to examine whether 
differences in judgments are accompanied by actual differences in behavior (Hines et al., 2015). 
Research on study time allocation has advanced many important ideas for education and learning 
environments, such as the factors that affect how long we study different information (Dunlosky 





well study behavior corresponds to self-report judgments, like JOLs. Similar to other 
metacognitive measures, study time allocation is affected by cues, metacognitive beliefs, 
expectations, constraints placed by the experimenter, etc. (Bjork et al., 2013). The factors that 
affect metacognitive judgments can have similar effects on study time allocation, but under 
certain conditions can have much different outcomes. Participants may identify items as being 
more difficult by giving them lower JOLs but then choose to study these difficult items for a 
shorter amount of time because they know that studying the less difficult items will result in a 
better overall performance on a future memory test (Son & Metcalfe, 2000). 
 Another type of reaction time measure is response time or latency. Similar to study time, 
response latency measures implicit behavior and is collected either when a response is made or 
after a response has been made. According to the Nelson and Narens’ (1990) framework, 
reaction time measures are similar to measures like CJs or FOKs because they are influenced by 
cues available at test. Factors such as retrieval fluency have similar effects on reaction time as 
they do on CJs, where items that are retrieved more quickly at test are associated with greater 
confidence (Serra & Dunlosky, 2005). As mentioned previously, fluency can lead to illusions of 
competence (Koriat & Bjork, 2005) and in the case of reaction time this has been found to 
mislead people into thinking that the faster a response comes to mind the more likely it will be 
recalled in the future (Benjamin et al., 1998).  
 The review of JOLs, CJs, and reaction time measures so far has been focused on their 
relation to memory in general. However, because the main focus of the research presented in this 
dissertation is on metamemory measures for associative recognition it is important to review the 
literature specific to this relation. Before examining these studies, a brief review of associative 





 Associative Memory 
The term associative memory refers to two bits of information (which will be referred to 
as items) and the connection between those two bits (Humphreys, 1976). Forming associations is 
important when forming knowledge structures in memory. The main purpose of studying 
associative memory is to understand the mechanisms that allow us to form a connection between 
two items and how this connection is stored and retrieved. This differs from other aspects of our 
memory system because it is not sufficient to remember a single item, or even multiple items, it 
is necessary to remember which items are connected. Memory for associations can be examined 
with cued recall where one member of the pair is presented at test and participants are asked to 
recall the paired item, or with a test of associative recognition. 
The current study was focused on recognition memory for associative information using 
an associative recognition test. For an associative recognition memory task, the way researchers 
can ensure participants have to rely on their associative memory and not their item memory, is to 
use a list of pairs with both intact and rearranged pairs (Cohn & Moscovitch, 2007). Intact pairs 
are simply two items that were previously paired together during study, these are considered old 
pairs. Rearranged pairs are created by a taking an item from one study pair and combining it with 
an item from another pair, this creates a new pair composed of two old items. When participants 
are tested on intact and rearranged pairs it is not sufficient to rely on their memory for the items 
because both intact (old) and rearranged (new) pairs consist of two old items, they must also 
recognize which items were paired together (i.e., associative information). Thus, associative 
recognition provides a relatively pure test of memory for associations (Humphreys, 1976) 






 For associative recognition memory, a signal detection approach can be applied not only 
to each individual item but also to the connection between two items. When a participant is 
asked to identify whether they recognize a pair from a list as being previously studied, this 
decision involves considering the memory strength of the association against a subjective 
threshold. If the strength of the memory for the association does not pass the threshold then the 
participant would consider that pair as “new”, meaning a pair that they do not recognize as being 
previously studied. The purpose of recognition memory research is to identify the factors that 
influence this signal detection system. 
In 2002, Yonelinas reviewed the popular models of recognition based on a dual process 
approach. In general, these models suggest that there are two components underlying the process 
of making a recognition decision. The first component is called familiarity and can be defined as 
a feeling of having previously encountered an item. Familiarity is similar to (or in some models 
be a proxy for) the memory strength assessed by a threshold criterion, mentioned previously, 
since it is also a subjective component used to identify an item as old or new. The second 
component is called recollection and can be defined as knowing whether an item was previously 
encountered based on recalled information about a previous study event. Yonelinas concluded 
that the literature shows many ways these two processes differ (processing speed, 
neuroanatomical substrates, support of novel learning, etc.), however what remains uncertain is 
what model best describes the relation between these two processes and how they function 
together to form the basis of our recognition memory. 
A dual process model explains the difference between item and associative memory. 
When using associative memory people can use recollection (or a recall-like process) to verify 





association for one or both of the words in the pair in order to correctly reject the pair as an old 
item. Rotello and Heit (2000) referred to this process as recall-to-reject, suggesting a fast process 
(familiarity) is used initially, but if this is unsuccessful then a slower recall-like process is used 
to provide mismatching information in order to correctly reject a new item. Hockley and Consoli 
(1999) also found support for a dual process theory of associative memory when they used 
Tulving’s (1985) remember-know paradigm to compare recognition for item and associative 
information for random word pairs. They found that more remember responses, which are made 
when details of a prior experience are able to be recalled (i.e., recollection), were given for 
associative recognition than item recognition, which had more know responses, which are made 
when details of prior experience are not recallable (i.e., familiarity). The accuracy of know 
responses was above chance for item recognition but at chance for associative recognition, which 
supports the idea that associative recognition requires an additional process to be accurate. 
The traditional view of recognition memory emphasizes the differences between item and 
associative information which leads to a benefit for associative memory when a recall processes 
is used. A novel approach to analyzing item and associative information considers how these two 
can be considered similar under certain circumstances. This theory, called unitization, is that 
once two items are paired together frequently enough they come to be viewed as a single item. A 
direct prediction from this is that a unitized pair functions similar to a single item. For example, 
Park and Yonelinas (2015) created two types of word pairs, one with a low level of unitization 
and one with a high level of unitization. The low unitization pairs were created by having 
participants study two words in the context of a sentence. The high unitization pairs were created 
by having participants study two words put together into a new compound word, along with a 





memory, but had no effect on item memory. Additionally, recollection and familiarity 
parameters in their model suggested that the benefit to associative memory was more so due to 
an increase in familiarity-based responding. This supports the claim that unitized pairs act like 
single items. 
Another way to examine the level of unitization is by manipulating the degree of pre-
experimental familiarity between item pairs. Ahmad and Hockley (2014) varied familiarity by 
comparing compound words to non-compound word pairs. For example, the compound word 
pair (candle-stick) was composed from the compound word candlestick, the non-compound word 
pair (door-pepper) was composed of the two unrelated words door and pepper. When they 
compared participants’ recognition memory for compound word pairs to non-compound word 
pairs using a yes or no associative recognition test they found a concordant effect where 
compound word pairs had higher hit rates, but also higher false alarm rates compared to non-
compound word pairs. This concordant effect is what they referred to as the compound word 
effect. They suggested that the reason for the compound word effect is that compound word pairs 
increase the use of familiarity-based responding, which in turn increases the rate of old 
responses. The inflated level of familiarity from compound word pairs led to both an increase in 
hit rates and a decrease in correct rejection rates. 
Associative Recognition Memory from a Metacognitive Perspective 
 The main purpose of this dissertation was to use metacognitive measures to examine 
associative recognition memory. Specifically, whether the typical findings from the 
metacognitive literature on item information was the same for associative information. There is a 
gap in the literature where associative recognition memory has not been examined with 





are many studies that have use paired associates as stimuli, or have looked at pair relatedness, 
there have been very few studies that consider the role metacognition has within an associative 
recognition memory model. Therefore, the research presented in this dissertation was exploratory 
in nature and had many questions that were not initially easy to predict. For example, are JOLs, 
CJs, study time and response time differentially affected by the characteristics of word pairs? In 
this section the few studies that have at least partially examined these or similar questions will be 
briefly considered. 
 It should be noted that one area of the associative memory literature that has focused on 
the impact of metacognition on associative memory is the aging literature. There is a large 
amount of research dedicated to the concept of aging differences in associative memory between 
younger and older adults, specifically, that younger adults do better in associative memory tasks 
compared to older adults (for a review see Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008). A well-documented 
finding is that these age differences are not a result of poor associative memory in older adults, 
but rather that older adults implement less effective metacognitive strategies or are negatively 
affected by incorrect metacognitive beliefs about their own memory abilities (Cavallini et al., 
2003; Dunlosky et al., 2003; Hertzog et al., 2002). It has been demonstrated that when older 
adults are given instructions to use effective learning strategies, like using imagery to form 
associations, they perform equally as well as younger adults (Emanuel Robinson et al., 2006; 
Price et al., 2008). While this area of research has important implications for our understanding 
of associative memory during a person’s lifespan, it does not explore the intricate aspects of 
associative recognition memory that is the main focus of the current research. 
Research by Hertzog and his colleagues has examined associative recognition memory 





participants study word pairs and included numerous metacognitive measures throughout the 
procedure (Hines et al.). They were interested in how metacognitive measures such as JOLs and 
CJs influenced decisions of study time allocation in a two trial associative recognition task. They 
had participants complete two study-test trials, where they studied the same 60 unrelated word 
pairs in both trials. During the first study-test phase participants gave immediate JOLs (0-100 
scale) for each pair at study, and CJs (also on a 0-100 scale) for each pair on the yes or no 
associative recognition test which was composed of half intact pairs and half rearranged pairs. 
Response time was also measured for each item on the test. They found that both intact and 
rearranged pairs were highly accurate, but intact pairs were responded to more quickly and were 
given higher and more accurate CJs than rearranged pairs. For intact pairs, JOLs were weakly 
correlated to recognition accuracy. Additionally, CJs were negatively correlated with study time 
at test 2, where items given higher CJs were studied less than items given lower CJs. These 
results give an initial idea on how metacognitive judgments may be utilized differently for 
associative recognition memory than other tests of memory, like cued recall.  
These results were partially replicated in two follow up studies (Hertzog et al., 2013; 
Hines et al., 2015). The focus of the follow up studies was more on the effect of memory for past 
tests (MPT) on JOLs, however a couple of important findings remained consistent with the 
previous 2009 study. Both follow up studies used the same unrelated word pairs as Hines et al. 
(2009) and had participants give JOLs and CJs for two study-test trials, where the stimulus list 
remained identical for both trials. JOLs were lower than recognition accuracy, substantially so in 
the first trial, but overall JOLs were weakly correlated with recognition accuracy. Also, CJs were 
generally high and positively correlated with recognition accuracy. Interestingly, JOLs were 





this was not the only influence on trial 2 JOLs, they were also influenced independently by trial 1 
CJs and trial 2 study time. These studies demonstrate a promising multiple-cue approach to 
understanding how JOLs are formed. 
Ultimately, the main findings from Hines et al., (2009) have the most relation to the 
research presented in this dissertation, however the lack of reporting hits, false alarms, and some 
discrimination measure (e.g., d’), makes it difficult to interpret the results in terms of recognition 
memory. It still remains an important study to examine and will be relevant later when 
interpreting the results of the research that will be presented in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Introduction to Experiments 
 The studies presented in this dissertation were designed to fill the gap in the literature on 
metacognitive behavior in relation to associative recognition memory. In a set of six 
experiments, the general procedure was designed to explore multiple metacognitive measures for 
different types of pairs of items that have been known to affect associative recognition memory 
performance. Participants were asked to study a list of paired associates, usually word pairs, and 
during study they were asked to give a JOL for each pair. A yes or no associative recognition 
memory test followed the study phase, which was composed of half intact and half rearranged 
pairs and participants were asked to give a CJ after each response. Reaction times were recorded 
throughout the entire procedure so that study time allocation and response latencies could also be 
examined. 
 Experiment 1, while serving as an introduction to this exploratory procedure, was also 
designed to replicate the compound word effect in associative recognition memory (Ahmad & 
Hockley, 2014). The result is a concordant effect, where compared to non-compound word pairs, 





discriminability. Experiment 1 provided initial data on how compound word pairs, which differ 
in pre-experimental associative strength compared to non-compound word pairs, affect JOLs, 
study time allocation, response latencies, and CJs. The primary difference in Experiment 2 was 
that the stimuli changed to concrete and abstract word pairs which have been found to result in a 
mirror effect, where concrete word pairs have higher hit rates, lower false alarm rates, and better 
discriminability compared to abstract word pairs (Hockley, 1994). The stimuli were once again 
changed in Experiment 3, this time to picture pairs and unrelated word pairs, where picture pairs 
have higher hit rates and better discriminability compared to unrelated word pairs but no 
difference in false alarm rates (Hockley, 2008). These three experiments not only provide a 
behavioural replication of the effects of different types of stimuli on associative recognition 
performance, they also examine metamemory measures for associative recognition memory 
where hit rates, false alarm rates, and discriminability have varying outcomes. 
 The subsequent three experiments attempted to manipulate metacognitive control by 
exploring different study conditions. Experiment 4 introduced a second study-test trial in order to 
examine whether practice would influence participants to reconsider how differences between 
pairs affects recognition memory at test. Similarly, Experiment 5 looked at whether feedback 
given on the first test would affect behavior on the second study-test trial. Lastly, Experiment 6 
explored a well-known finding in the metacognitive literature that delaying the interval between 





Chapter 2: Experiments I-III 
Experiment 1 
 An integral part of our memory system is storing connections between pieces of 
information, such as a face with a name or a word with its definition. Previous research has 
covered many aspects of how our associative memory works, from the way we initially encode 
information to the way we maintain and store information, to the mechanisms responsible for 
retrieving information from memory (for a review see Yonelinas, 2002). Recently, there have 
been new findings from research on metamemory that, at times, has challenged the way we have 
viewed existing memory systems, including associative memory (e.g., Nelson & Narens, 1990). 
However, since the area of metacognition is still relatively new there is still work that needs to be 
done before fully understanding the role metamemory has within a model of human memory. 
One of the goals of the research reported in this dissertation was to explore one particular aspect 
of memory, associative recognition, and how it is affected by metamemory behavior. 
  The general procedure of all of the experiments reported in this dissertation reflect the 
exploratory nature of this research. When designing the first experiment the aim was to include 
multiple metamemory measures within a typical associative recognition memory task in order to 
examine metacognitive behavior at different time points. Additionally, this design would allow 
for an analysis of the correlation between different metamemory measures which may offer 
insight on whether they correspond to similar or different aspects of memory. Ultimately, we 
included four measures of metamemory: JOLs, study time, CJs, and response latencies. JOLs and 
study time were both collected or measured during the first phase of the experiments when 
participants were asked to study a list of pairs of items. JOLs were collected as a measure of 
study behavior that was expected to reflect the nature of the material being studied, meaning that 





pairs (Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005). Study time was a similar measure, however it is more of an 
implicit measure that does not always correspond to self-report ratings (Metcalfe, 2002). CJs and 
response latencies were collected during the second phase of the experiments when participants 
were asked to decide whether a pair of items were previously presented at study or not. Like 
JOLs, CJs are self-report measures of behavior, but unlike JOLs they do not measure confidence 
in future performance but rather performance on an item after it has been tested. Lastly, response 
latencies are a similar reaction time measure as study time, but correspond to behavior at test. 
 In general, there were a few predicted outcomes for the metamemory measures that were 
expected based on previous research. First, it was expected that JOLs and CJs would reflect a 
difference in the stimulus characteristics of the word pairs. For instance, in the first experiment 
one prediction was that participants would give higher JOLs to compound word pairs compared 
to non-compound word pairs. This is based on previous studies where differences in the 
characteristics of stimuli influenced the direction of JOLs (e.g., Witherby & Tauber, 2017). 
Second, JOLs were expected to be quite low in terms of their correlation to actual test 
performance, while CJs were expected to have a moderate to high correlation to test 
performance. This was based on research on JOLs (Tauber et al., 2015) and CJs (Siedlecka et al., 
2019), which have been found to have noticeably different absolute accuracies. Third, study time 
allocation and response latencies were expected to have a negative relation with JOLs and CJs, 
respectively. For instance, if an item was given a high JOL it would be studied for a less amount 
of time compared to an item that was given a low JOL. This prediction was based on the 
literature on study time allocation (e.g., Metcalfe, 2002). As for the relation among the different 
measures, it was too difficult to predict what to expect therefore this remained an open question 





 In terms of associative memory, the central purpose of the first three experiments 
included in this chapter was to examine differences in stimuli that had relatively consistent 
effects on associative recognition performance. The three experiments included in this chapter 
each used a different set of stimuli that have been previously shown to have different outcomes 
in terms of hit rates, false alarm rates, or discriminability. The first experiment was designed to 
replicate the concordant Compound Word effect (Ahmad & Hockley, 2014). It was expected that 
compound word pairs would have higher hit rates, higher false alarm rates, and similar 
discriminability compared to non-compound word pairs. Then, in our second experiment we 
changed the stimuli to concrete and abstract word pairs because they have been found to produce 
a mirror effect. Specifically, concrete word pairs were expected to have higher hit rates, lower 
false alarm rates, and better discriminability compared to abstract word pairs. Lastly, our third 
experiment once again changed the stimuli to unrelated pairs of pictures and words, which was 
expected to produce a unique pattern of results from the previous two experiments based on 
previous work on the picture superiority effect in associative recognition (Hockley, 2008). 
Picture pairs were expected to have higher hit rates, equal false alarm rates, and better 
discriminability compared to unrelated word pairs. By examining three examples where there is a 
noticeable difference in performance on an associative recognition task, it was of interest to see 
whether the accompanying metacognitive behavior would also be noticeably different. 
 As mentioned previously, one of the primary purposes of Experiment 1 was to replicate 
the procedure of Ahmad and Hockley (2014). In particular, their first experiment where they had 
participants study both compound word pairs (air-stream) and non-compound word pairs (death-
thing), then tested them using a yes or no associative recognition test. One immediate difference 





wax), high strength word pairs (below-above), and low strength word pairs (brother-sibling). The 
strength between word pairs refers to the forward associative strength as measured by word 
association norms (Nelson et al., 1998), where greater strength indicates a higher likelihood that 
the left side word will produce the right side word if presented as a cue. We decided to include 
high strength and low strength word pairs as oppose to unrelated word pairs, which were used by 
Ahmad and Hockley (2014), in order to test whether word pairs that had some level of pre-
experimental association would produce a concordant effect. 
 The other main purpose of Experiment 1 was to introduce a number of metacognitive 
measures into an associative recognition task. While participants were studying the list of word 
pairs they were asked to make a JOL after each pair, indicating an immediate prediction of 
prospective memory performance. Also during the study phase, participants were allowed to 
study the word pairs for as long as they wanted, this allowed us to record the amount of time 
participants took to study each word pair as a measure of study time allocation. Participants were 
not told that study time would be recorded so this measure is relatively free of bias or demand 
characteristics. During the test phase participants were asked to make a CJ after each response, 
indicating an immediate measure of performance. Once again, we allowed them as much time as 
they wanted before making a response and recorded the response latencies.   
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-nine participants took part in Experiment 1, this sample size is comparable to other 
previous studies on recognition memory (e.g., Ahmad & Hockley, 2014). For the three 
experiments presented in this chapter the only requirements for participation was that English 





Laurier University. No basic demographic information (age and gender) was collected from the 
participants; however, we are not aware of any effects of age or gender differences in young 
adults that affect recognition memory. For Experiment 1, one participant did not complete the 
entire procedure; therefore, their data was discarded. Two participants were excluded for failing 
to follow instructions. We used a corrected recognition score (hit rate – false alarm rate) to 
determine exclusion from further analysis, which resulted in data from four participants being 
excluded from Experiment 1 because they had low corrected recognition scores (<= 0.15). The 
remaining data from 32 participants was used for the analysis of Experiment 1. Regardless of 
their inclusion in the data analysis, all participants received course credit in exchange for their 
participation. 
Materials 
The experiment was conducted on an IBM-compatible PC computer with a 17-in. LCD 
monitor housed in an individual cubicle and using SuperLab 5.0 software (Cedrus, San Pedro, 
CA). There were a total of 114 word pairs, presented in Gills Sans MT, style-Regular, color-
black, size 28 font on a white background, with 10 spaces in between the two words. There were 
three types of word pairs: Compound, High Strength, and Low Strength. The Compound pairs 
were comprised of 38 word pairs taken from a combination of Jones (2005) and Ahmad and 
Hockley (2014). The High Strength and Low Strength pairs were comprised of 76 word pairs 
which were created from the Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber (1998) word association norms. 
From the database we adopted the following criteria: High Strength pairs had a minimum 
forward association value of .20 and Low Strength pairs had a forward association value greater 






Each participant completed the experiment individually in a small cubicle. The 
experiment began with an introduction informing participants that they would be asked to study a 
list of word pairs for an upcoming memory test. They were told that they could study each pair 
for as long as they wanted, and after each pair they would be prompted to give a JOL. They were 
told to use the keyboard to make their responses and could begin when they were ready. 
The study phase was composed of 114 trials. For each trial participants studied a word 
pair and then gave a JOL rating for that pair. Each trial was self-paced, participants pressed the 
spacebar when they were finished studying a pair and again when they were satisfied with the 
JOL rating they made. A study time measure in milliseconds (ms), was made by recording the 
time a pair first appeared on screen to when the spacebar was pressed. Participants were not 
explicitly informed that we were recording how long they took to complete different parts of the 
experiment. Following a word pair, participants were prompted to give a JOL rating between 1-
100, 1 indicating, “You do not think you will remember the word pair at all”, and 100 indicating, 
“You will definitely remember the word pair”. They were encouraged to make use of the entire 
range of the scale. A display box showed their response and allowed them to make any 
corrections. Of the 114 study trials, three trials at the beginning of study and three at the end of 
study were used to account for recency and primacy effects and were therefore not analyzed. The 
remaining 108 trials were composed of 36 trials for each of the Compound, High Strength, and 
Low Strength pair types. The study list was presented in a completely random order. Participants 
were not explicitly informed about the different types of word pairs. 
The test phase began after participants confirmed with the experimenter that they had 
completed the study phase. They were then informed that they would be given a memory test on 





pair had been presented during the study phase, responding with the “s” key to indicate yes or the 
“n” key to indicate no. They were also informed that they would be asked for a CJ after each 
response and that the CJ would be from 1-10, 1 indicating, “You have no idea whether your 
response is correct or not”, and 10 indicating, “You are absolutely certain that your response is 
correct”. The test began immediately after the instructions were given. 
The test phase was composed of 72 trials. Each trial was self-paced and contained a word 
pair and a CJ rating. The 72 trials were composed of 24 trials for each of the Compound, High 
Strength, and Low Strength pair types. For each of these 24 trials, half were intact pairs 
(appeared the same as on the study list) and half were rearranged pairs. Rearranged pairs were 
made by using two study list pairs, the left-side word of one pair was used with the right-side 
word of another pair; left-right side location and pair type remained the same (i.e., a new 
Compound word pair was made from two previous Compound pairs). The test list was presented 
in a completely random order which was different for each participant. Response latencies were 
measure by recording the interval between a test pair first appearing on screen and when a 
response key was pressed. 
Results 
Recognition Performance 
The descriptive statistics for hit rates (HR), false alarm rates (FAR), d’, and C can be 
found in Table 1. We first ran a 2 (Probe Type: HR vs. FAR) x 3 (Pair Type: Compound vs. 
High Strength vs. Low Strength) repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)2 with 
proportion of old responses as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of Probe Type 
(F(1, 31) = 290.75, MSe = 0.05, p < .001, η
2
p = .9) with HR being greater than FAR, a main 
 
2 For all three experiments, if a repeated measures ANOVA was used then the assumption of sphericity was tested 





effect of Pair Type (F(2, 62) = 25.78,  MSe = 0.01, p < .001, η
2
p = .45), and no significant 
interaction (F(2, 62) < 1).  
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Associative Recognition Performance Measures by Pair Type for 
Experiment 1. 
 
To further analyze the main effect of Pair Type, a post-hoc analysis was done using 
paired sample t-tests with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. The tests showed that 
Compound pairs did not differ from High Strength pairs (t(31) = 0.12, p = 1, d = 0.02), 
Compound pairs were greater than Low strength pairs (t(31) = 5.76, p < .001, d = 1.02), and 
High strength pairs were greater than Low Strength pairs (t(31) = 6.4, p < .001, d = 1.13). The 
pattern of means is consistent with a concordant effect (higher HR and higher FAR) when 
comparing Compound pairs to Low Strength pairs and when comparing High Strength pairs to 











HR .87 (.09) .86 (.11) .71 (.16) 
FAR .32 (.13) .31 (.16) .20 (.16) 
d’ 1.76 (.75) 1.72 (.70) 1.58 (.84) 






Mean Hits and False Alarms for Each Pair Type in Experiment 1. The error bars represent 
standard deviations of the means.  
 
A Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test was performed to examine the differences in d’ 
according to the Pair Type. No significant differences (χ2(2) = 0.39, p = .82)3 were found among 
the three Pair Types (Compound, High Strength, and Low Strength). This is in line with the 
concordant effect mentioned previously, as the decrease in both HR and FAR for Low Strength 
pairs compared to both Compound and High Strength pairs resulted in equal d’ values. To 
examine C we performed one sample t-tests to see if they differed from zero and found that 
Compound pairs (t(31) = -6.12, p < .001, d = 1.08), and High Strength pairs (t(31) = -6.79, p < 
 
3 An initial one-way ANOVA showed the same result (F(2, 93) < 1), however the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test was 





.001, d = 1.2) had a significant liberal bias, while Low Strength pairs had a significant 
conservative bias (t(31) = 2.57, p = .015, d = 0.45). 
Metacognitive Measures 
Study 
The means and standard deviations for JOLs and Study Time can be found in Table 2. 
We ran a one-way ANOVA with Pair Type (Compound vs. High Strength vs. Low Strength) as a 
within-subjects factor and mean JOL as the dependent variable. There was a significant effect of 
Pair type (F(2, 93) = 5.78, MSe = 363.8, p = .004, η
2
p = .11). A post-hoc analysis using a Tukey 
Test was done on all planned pairwise comparisons which showed that Compound pairs were 
greater than Low Strength pairs (p = .026), High strength pairs were greater than Low Strength 
pairs (p = .006), and Compound pairs did not differ from High Strength pairs (p = .86). The same 
ANOVA was run on mean Study Time4; there was no significant effect of Pair Type (F(2, 93) < 
1).  
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures (Mean JOLs and Study Time in sec.) by Pair 







JOLs 63.49 (19.67) 65.99 (18.12) 50.87 (19.40) 
Study Time 4.51 (3.04) 4.55 (3.26) 5.45 (3.28) 
 
 
4 Extreme outliers were identified – and removed – using boxplot methods as values above Q3 + (1.5xIQR) or below 
Q1 – (1.5xIQR), where Q1 and Q3 are the first and third quartiles, respectively, and IQR is the interquartile range. 







The means and standard deviations for CJs and Test Response Time can be found in 
Table 3. We ran a 4 (Response Type: Hits vs. False alarms vs. Correct rejections vs. Misses) x 3 
(Pair Type: Compound vs. High Strength vs. Low Strength) repeated measures ANOVA with 
mean CJ as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of Response Type (F(2.03, 26.36) = 
13.82, MSe = 5.1, p < .001, η
2
p = .52), a main effect of Pair Type (F(2, 26) = 6.08,  MSe = 0.77, p 





Descriptive statistics for metacognitive measures at test (mean CJs and Response Time in sec) by 
Pair Type and Probe Type for Experiment 1. 
 
 
For both main effects post-hoc analyses were done on all comparisons using paired 
sample t-tests with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. In terms of CJs by Pair Type: CJs for 









CJs     
Compound 8.95 (0.94) 7.40 (1.51) 7.35 (1.62) 5.62 (2.39) 
High Strength 9.06 (0.82) 7.95 (1.23) 8.03 (1.69) 6.15 (2.39) 
Low Strength 8.62 (0.92) 6.71 (1.76) 7.58 (1.55) 5.75 (2.07) 
Response Time     
Compound 2.29 (0.67) 3.01 (1.15) 3.10 (0.76) 3.47 (2.37) 
High Strength 2.43 (0.72) 3.58 (2.07) 3.44 (1.15) 2.92 (1.31) 





High Strength pairs were greater than Compound pairs (t(16) = -3.57, p = .008, d = 0.87), CJs for 
High Strength pairs were greater than Low Strength pairs (t(15) = 4.3, p = .002, d = 1.08), and 
CJs for Compound pairs did not differ from Low Strength pairs (t(16) = 0.64, p = 1, d = 0.15). 
This pattern of results indicates that participants were more confident in their memory for High 
Strength pairs than for either Compound or Low Strength pairs. 
The analysis for Response Type5 showed that Hits were greater than False alarms (t(23) = 
-7.15, p < .001, d = 1.46), Hits were greater than Correct rejections (t(31) = -6.61, p < .001, d = 
1.17), Hits were greater than Misses (t(16) = 5.8, p < .001, d = 1.41), False alarms were greater 
than Misses (t(13) = 3.78, p = .014, d = 1.01), Correction rejections were greater than Misses 
(t(16) = 3.25, p = .03, d = 0.79), and Correct rejections and False alarms did not differ (t(23) = 
0.03, p = 1, d = 0.01). This pattern of results suggest that participants’ overall CJs were in line 
with their performance, since they gave greater CJs when they were correct than incorrect.  
The same ANOVA was run on mean Test Response Time; there was a significant main 
effect of Response type (F(3, 24) = 3.37, MSe = 0.84, p =.035, η
2
p = .3), no main effect of Pair 
Type (F(2, 16) = 3.38, MSe = 0.33, p =.06, η
2
p = .3), and no significant interaction (F(2.87, 
22.98) = 1.08, MSe = 1.76, p =.386, η
2
p = .12).  
For the main effect of Response Type a post-hoc analysis was performed on all 
comparisons using paired sample t-tests with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. False 
alarms were greater than Hits (t(26) = -5.43, p < .001, d = 1.05), Correct rejections were greater 
than Hits (t(31) = 7.76, p < .001, d = 1.37), Misses were greater than Hits (t(14) = -3.35, p = 
.028, d = 0.87), False alarms did not differ from Correct rejections (t(26) = 0.42, p = 1, d = 0.08), 
False alarms did not differ from Misses (t(13) = -0.68, p = 1, d = 0.18), and Correct rejections 
 
5 For all three experiments, when examining a Response Type factor the degrees of freedom varies because not all 





did not differ from Misses (t(14) = -0.34, p = 1, d = 0.09). Overall participants were quickest to 
respond after a Hit, while response times were equal following a Miss, a Correct rejection, and a 
False alarm.  
Performance x Metacognition 
To look at the accuracy of JOLs we ran gamma correlations using JOLs given at study 
and their corresponding performance at test6. All three pair types, Compound (M = .24, SD =.48), 
High Strength (M = .20, SD = .61), and Low Strength (M = .32, SD = .39) had moderately low 
correlations. This suggests participants were not very accurate at predicting their performance 
when prompted immediately after study. 
To examine the accuracy of CJs we once again used gamma correlations but analyzed 
Intact and Rearranged pairs separately. For Intact pairs all three pair types, Compound (M = .72, 
SD = .42), High Strength (M = .70, SD =.55), and Low Strength (M = .75, SD = .32) had 
moderately high correlations, while for Rearranged pairs all three pairs types, Compound (M = -
.12, SD = .54), High Strength (M = .07, SD =.58), and Low Strength (M = .22, SD = .68) had 
correlations that were low and close to zero. Overall participants were accurate at judging their 
performance on Intact trials but not rearranged trials. 
Discussion 
We replicated the concordant Compound Word effect for both Compound word pairs and 
High Strength word pairs when compared to Low Strength word pairs. As expected, d’ did not 
differ among the three pair types. In terms of metacognitive measures, during study participants 
gave higher JOLs and less study time to Compound and High Strength pairs compared to Low 
Strength pairs indicating that they considered Compound and High Strength pairs easier to 
 
6 Trial-by-trial JOLs collected at study ask for a judgment of future performance, therefore the accuracy of a JOL 





remember than Low Strength pairs. During test participants were most confident in their 
responses to High Strength pairs compared to Compound and Low Strength pairs, while the 
response times did not differ among the three pair types. However, response times did differ 
based on correctness, where participants were fast to respond when they were correct (Hit) but 
also incorrect (Miss) demonstrating a discrepancy in their implicit metacognitive judgments for 
Intact trials. 
When considering participants’ memory performance and metacognitive measures 
together, JOLs were not very accurate at predicting future performance. This is consistent with 
the literature on immediate JOL ratings given directly after each study trial. On the other hand, 
CJs indicated that at test participants were more accurate overall at judging their memory 
performance because they gave higher ratings when they were correct than when they were 
incorrect. They also had faster reaction times when they were correct. However, participants 
were only accurate at judging their performance on intact trials, not rearranged trials. This 
discrepancy seemed to be largest for Compound word pairs which even had a negative relation 
between CJs and performance on rearranged trials. The poor accuracy for CJs for rearranged 
trials is likely caused by their increased familiarity resulting in increased confidence for false 
alarms. This finding corresponds with the results from DeSoto and Roediger (2014) who found 
that confidence ratings are similarly poorly correlated with accuracy for related lures. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1 we used compound word pairs in order to replicate the concordant 
Compound Word effect; we also found that it generalized to word pairs with high pre-
experimental association (high strength). By including numerous metacognitive measures 





metacognitive behavior as they completed an associative memory task. For Experiment 2 we 
changed the stimulus manipulation in such a way as to find a different pattern for memory 
performance. That is, instead of using compound word pairs and finding a concordant effect, we 
used concrete and abstract word pairs and expected to find a mirror effect. Studies have shown 
that concrete word pairs have higher hit rates, lower false alarm rates, and better discriminability 
than abstract word pairs (Hockley, 1994; Paivio, et al., 1994). If we were to find this pattern for 
the memory performance, we would expect participants to show favourable metacognitive 
ratings towards concrete word pairs compared to abstract word pairs. It was uncertain how this 
change in stimulus manipulation would affect other aspects of participants’ metacognitive 
behavior. Would there be a large difference between judgments for the two types of word pairs? 
Would all the metacognitive measures show similar discrepancies? How would the accuracy of 
participants’ judgments change? In general, our goal for Experiment 2 was to gain more insight 
into how metacognitive behavior changes when associative memory performance changes. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two participants took part in Experiment 2. For this experiment, data from four 
participants was excluded because they had low corrected recognition scores. This left data from 
28 participants which was used for the analysis of Experiment 2. 
Materials 
There were 96 word pairs of two types: Concrete and Abstract. All words were taken 
from the MRC Psycholinguistic database (Coltheart, 1981). Concrete words had a minimum 
concreteness value of 600 (M = 616.4, SD = 12.85), while Abstract words had a maximum 





imageability, word frequency, word length and number of syllables. Word pairs were created by 
randomly putting two words of the same type together. All other materials were identical to 
Experiment 1 (see Appendix B for list of word pairs). 
Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 2 followed that of Experiment 1, with a few notable 
changes. The number of study trials was reduced to 96; three trials at the beginning and at the 
end of the study phase accounted for primacy and recency effects and were not analyzed. Of the 
remaining trials half were Concrete and half were Abstract, although the list was presented 
randomly. For the test phase we gave participants feedback on whether they were correct or 
incorrect, the feedback slide lasted for 1000 ms. Participants first gave their yes or no response to 
each pair, then they were asked for a CJ, then feedback was given. Lastly, participants were told 
how well they did overall at the end of the experiment. 
Results 
Recognition performance 
The descriptive statistics for hit rates (HR), false alarm rates (FAR), d’, and C can be 
found in Table 4. We first ran a 2 (Probe Type: HR vs. FAR) x 2 (Pair Type: Concrete vs. 
Abstract) repeated measures ANOVA with proportion of old responses as the dependent 
variable. There was a main effect of Probe Type (F(1, 27) = 237.05, MSe = 0.04, p < .001, η
2
p = 
.9) where HR was greater than FAR, no main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 27) < 1), and a significant 
interaction (F(1, 27) = 23.14, MSe = 0.01, p < .001, η
2









Descriptive Statistics for Associative Recognition Performance Measures by Pair Type for 
Experiment 2. 
 
To examine the interaction between Pair Types and Probe Types, we performed pairwise 
comparisons using paired sample t-test with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. Concrete 
pairs had a greater HR than Abstract pairs (t(27) = -3.73, p < .001), while Abstract pairs had a 
greater FAR than Concrete pairs (t(27) = 3.17, p = .004). This pattern demonstrated a mirror 















HR .83 (.13) .72 (.16) 
FAR .14 (.13) .23 (.13) 
d’ 2.40 (1.09) 1.51 (.85) 






Mean Hits and False Alarms for Each Pair Type in Experiment 2. The error bars represent 
standard deviations of the means. 
 
A Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test was performed to examine the difference in d’ according 
to the Pair Type. There was a significant difference (χ2(1) = 8.21, p = .004)7, Concrete pairs had 
greater d’ values than Abstract pairs. To examine C we performed one sample t-tests to see if the 
criterion estimates differed from zero. Neither estimate for Concrete (t(27) = 0.89, p = .381, d = 
0.17) nor Abstract pairs (t(27) = 1.09, p = .287, d = 0.21) differed from zero, meaning both had 
no significant bias. 
Metacognitive Measures 
 
7 A one-way ANOVA showed the same result (F(1, 54) = 11.16, MSe = 0.95, p = .001, η2p = .18), however the 





Three participants were excluded from data analysis for all of the metacognitive measures 
due to failure to follow instructions. The reasons for this varied, however some examples 
include: giving the same JOL for all study trials, failing to give any JOL or CJ ratings, or giving 
ratings outside of specified range. 
Study 
The means and standard deviations for JOLs and Study Time can be found in Table 5. 
We ran a one-way ANOVA with Pair Type (Concrete vs. Abstract) as a within-subjects factor 
and mean JOL as the dependent variable. There was no significant effect of Pair Type (F(1, 48) 
< 1). A Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test was performed on mean Study; there was no main effect 
(χ2(1) = 0.01, p = .934)8. 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures (Mean JOLs and Study Time in sec) by Pair 





JOLs 55.99 (16.63) 51.99 (16.04) 
Study time 8.91 (4.41) 9.12 (4.74) 
 
Test 
The means and standard deviations for CJs and Test Response Time can be found in 
Table 6. We ran a 4 (Response Type: Hits vs. False alarms vs. Correct rejections vs. Misses) x 2 
(Pair Type: Concrete vs. Abstract) repeated measures ANOVA with mean CJ as the dependent 
 
8 A one-way ANOVA showed the same result (F(1, 46) < 1), however the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test was used 





variable. There was a main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 10) = 17.27, MSe = 1.9, p = .002, η
2
p = .63) 
where CJs for Concrete pairs was greater than for Abstract pairs, a main effect of Response Type 
(F(3, 30) = 10.05, MSe = 1.89, p < .001, η
2
p = .5), and no significant interaction effect (F(2.14, 
21.37) = 1.10, MSe = 0.75, p = .355, η
2
p = .1). 
Table 6 
 Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures at Test (Mean CJs and Response Time in sec) 
by Pair Type and Probe Type for Experiment 2. 
 
 
 For Response Type we ran a post-hoc analysis on all comparisons using paired sample t-
tests with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. The analysis showed that Hits were greater 
than False alarms (t(14) = -5.34, p < .001, d = -1.38), Hits were greater than Correct rejections 
(t(24) = -4.15, p = .002, d = 0.83), Hits were greater than Misses (t(13) = 5.14, p = .001, d = 
1.37), Correct rejections were greater than Misses (t(13) = 4.65, p = .003, d = 1.24), False alarms 
did not differ from Correct rejections (t(14) = 2.58, p = .132, d = 0.67), and False alarms did not 
differ from Misses (t(10) = 1.03, p = 1, d = 0.31). This pattern of results suggest that participants’ 









CJs     
Concrete 8.87 (1.05) 6.97 (1.99) 8.33 (1.48) 6.28 (1.94) 
Abstract 7.87 (1.51) 5.34 (2.01) 6.69 (1.58) 5.37 (1.72) 
Response Time     
Concrete 2.86 (0.89) 4.42 (1.84) 3.16 (0.79) 3.92 (1.61) 





overall CJs were in line with their performance, since they gave greater CJs when they were 
correct than incorrect.  
The same ANOVA was run on mean Test Response; there was a main effect of Pair Type 
(F(1, 10) = 11.37, MSe = 1.29, p = .007, η
2
p = .53) where response time was greater for Abstract 
pairs than Concrete pairs, a main effect of Response Type (F(3, 30) = 3.21, MSe = 1.54, p = .037, 




For the main effect of Response Type a post-hoc analysis on all comparisons was done 
using paired sample t-test with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. The analysis showed that 
False alarms were greater than Hits (t(14) = 3.25, p = .035, d = 0.84), False alarms were greater 
than Correct rejections (t(14) = -3.08, p = .048, d = 0.8), Correct rejections did not differ from 
Hits (t(24) = 0.77, p = 1, d = 0.16), Misses did not differ from Hits (t(13) = -1.04, p = 1, d = 
0.28), False alarms did not differ from Misses (t(10) = 2.53, p = 0.178, d = 0.76), and Correct 
rejections did not differ from Misses (t(13) = -1.04, p = 1, d = 0.28). Overall participants 
responded the slowest when they incorrectly thought a rearranged trial was an intact trial.  
Performance x Metacognition 
To look at the accuracy of JOLs we ran gamma correlations using JOLs given at study 
and their corresponding performance at test. Concrete pairs (M = .074, SD = .45) had correlations 
close to zero, and Abstract pairs (M = .3, SD = .57) had low correlations. This suggests 
participants were not very accurate at predicting their future performance based on their study. 
To examine the accuracy of CJs we once again used gamma correlations, but analyzed 
Intact and Rearranged pairs separately. For Intact trials both Concrete pairs (M = .65, SD = .39) 





trials both Concrete pairs (M = .15, SD = .6) and Abstract pairs (M = .25, SD = .53) had low 
correlations. Overall participants were accurate at judging their performance on Intact trials but 
not rearranged trials. 
Discussion 
We replicated the mirror effect typically found between Concrete and Abstract word 
pairs. This resulted in significant differences in discriminability, as measured by d’, where 
Concrete pairs had better discriminability than Abstract pairs. Interestingly, this difference did 
not seem to affect metacognitive behavior at study as participants gave equal JOLs and study 
time to Concrete and Abstract pairs. Suggesting that participants considered the two pair types 
equally difficult to remember. However, during test participants gave greater CJs and were faster 
to respond to Concrete than Abstract pairs indicating that they were more confident in their 
memory for Concrete than Abstract pairs. In addition, participants gave greater CJs and were 
faster to respond when they were correct than incorrect. Overall, participants’ metacognitive 
behavior at test was in line with their performance. 
Considering the correlation between participants’ memory performance and 
metacognitive measures, JOLs were once again not very accurate at predicting performance. 
This, in addition to the lack of differences between JOLs for concrete and abstract pairs 
demonstrates the poor relation between JOLs and memory performance. The pattern for CJs was 
also similar to Experiment 1, where CJs had moderately high accuracy for intact trials but low 
accuracy for rearranged trials. This pattern seemed to be consistent for Concrete and Abstract 
pairs, suggesting this stimulus manipulation did not affect the discrepancy in metacognitive 







Experiment 2 was successful in replicating the mirror effect typically found between 
concrete and abstract word pairs. This was in contrast to Experiment 1 where we found a 
concordant effect between word pairs with high pre-experimental association and word pairs 
with low pre-experimental association. Considering the clear memory advantage of concrete 
word pairs to abstract word pairs it was surprising that participants did not report higher 
judgments for concrete word pairs than abstract word pairs at study, nor did they study one type 
of pair longer than the other. However, participants were more confident in their responses at test 
for concrete compared to abstract word pairs. For Experiment 3, we were interested in seeing 
whether this discrepancy in metacognitive accuracy between study and test would remain the 
same when a more salient stimulus manipulation was used. Therefore, we tested participants’ 
associative memory on picture pairs compared to word pairs. We expected to find a picture 
superiority effect, picture pairs having higher hit rates compared to word pairs, which has been 
consistently shown to occur in associative memory tasks (Hockley, 2008; Hockley & Bancroft, 
2011). The only change in the expected pattern of results compared to Experiment 2 was that 
there would be no difference in the false alarm rates for the two types of rearranged pairs. 
However, we were interested in knowing whether the much more noticeable difference between 
the pair types would have an effect on metacognitive behavior. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-six participants took part in Experiment 3. For this experiment, data from two 
participants was excluded because they had low corrected recognition scores. This left data from 






A total of 184 pictures with their corresponding verbal labels were chosen from the Bonin 
et al. (2003) norm set. Two lists were created of 90 pictures each and their corresponding labels. 
Pictures were basic black and white line drawings of common objects, such as a canoe, a bus, a 
peach, etc. We counterbalanced the lists such that half of the participants were tested on the 
pictures of list one with the word labels of list two and the other half of the participants were 
tested on pictures of list two with the word labels of list one. There were four picture-label pairs 
used to account for primacy and recency effects and were not analyzed. All other materials were 
identical to Experiments 1 and 2. 
Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 3 followed that of Experiment 2, except for the stimulus 
changes and that there were only two trials at the beginning and end of the study list used to 
account for primacy and recency effects. One other change, which was unintentional and due to a 
programming error, was that while the word or picture pair was displayed participants could 
input their JOL response at any point. This means that, unlike Experiments 1 and 2, for 
Experiment 3 we could not distinguish between the time used for study and the time used to 
make a JOL. 
Results 
Recognition performance 
The descriptive statistics for hit rates (HR), false alarm rates (FAR), d’, and C can be 
found in Table 7. We first ran a 2 (Probe Type: HR vs. FAR) x 2 (Pair Type: Words vs. Pictures) 
repeated measures ANOVA with proportion of old responses as the dependent variable. There 
was a main effect of Probe Type (F(1, 43) = 470.19, MSe = 0.04, p < .001, η
2





was greater than FAR, no main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 43) < 1), and a significant interaction 
(F(1, 43) = 18.39, MSe = 0.01, p < .001, η
2
p = .3). 
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics for Associative Recognition Performance Measures by Pair Type for 
Experiment 3. 
 
To examine the interaction, we performed paired sample t-tests for each Pair Type by 
Probe Type, with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. Picture pairs had a greater HR than 
Word pairs (t(43) = 3.69, p < .001, d = .56), while Word pairs had a greater FAR than Picture 














HR .87 (.13) .79 (.17) 
FAR .14 (.13) .19 (.13) 
d’ 2.55 (.98) 1.98 (.96) 






Mean Hits and False Alarms for Each Pair Type in Experiment 3. The error bars represent 
standard deviations of the means. 
 
We performed a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test for Pair Type (Words vs. Pictures) on d’ 
and found a significant effect (χ2(1) = 7.45, p = .006)9, where discrimination for Picture pairs 
was greater than for Word pairs. To examine C we performed one sample t-tests to see if the 
criterion estimates differed from zero. Neither estimate for Picture (t(43) = -0.19, p = .849, d = 




9 A one-way ANOVA showed the same result (F(1, 86) = 7.48, MSe = 0.94, p = .008, η2p = .08), however the 






Six participants were excluded from data analysis for all of the metacognitive measures 
in Experiment 3 for not following instructions. 
Study 
The means and standard deviations for JOLs and Study Time can be found in Table 8. 
For the JOLs we ran a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test with Pair Type (Words vs. Pictures) as a 
within-subjects factor10. There was no main effect (χ2(1) = 0.07, p = .787). We ran a one way 
ANOVA on mean Study Time; there was no main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 74) = 3.19, MSe = 
7.42, p = .078, η2p = .04). There appears to be a trend of Pictures being studied longer than 
Words, this difference may also have been attenuated by the fact that the study time measure in 
Experiment 3 included the time to make a JOL response. 
Table 8 
 Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures (Mean JOLs and Study Time in sec) by Pair 
Type for Experiment 3. 
 
Test 
The means and standard deviations for CJs and Test Response Time can be found in 
Table 9. We ran a 4 (Response Type: Hits vs. False alarms vs. Correct rejections vs. Misses) x 2 
 
10 A one-way ANOVA showed the same result (F(1, 74) < 1), however the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test was used 





JOLs 55.20 (17.38) 53.76 (16.41) 





(Pair Type: Words vs. Pictures) repeated measures ANOVA on the mean CJs. There was a main 
effect of Response Type (F(3, 42) = 15.53, MSe = 3.58, p < .001, η
2
p = .53), no main effect of 
Pair Type (F(1, 14) = 1.01, MSe = 1.51, p = .332, η
2
p = .07), and no significant interaction (F(3, 
42) = 1.81, MSe = 1.57, p = .16, η
2
p = .11). 
Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures at Test (Mean CJs and Response Time in sec) 
by Pair Type and Probe Type for Experiment 3. 









CJs     
Pictures 8.80 (0.94) 5.93 (2.42) 8.07 (1.57) 5.82 (2.15) 
Words 8.47 (1.11) 5.80 (2.06) 7.30 (1.45) 5.21 (1.45) 
Response Time     
Pictures 2.80 (0.91) 4.10 (1.66) 3.11 (0.96) 3.13 (1.36) 
Words 2.83 (0.73) 3.97 (1.68) 3.48 (1.29) 3.74 (1.86) 
 
For the main effect of Response Type a post-hoc analysis was done for all comparisons 
using paired sample t-tests with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. The analysis for 
Response Type showed that Hits were greater than False alarms (t(19) = -5.36, p < .001, d = 1.2), 
Hits were greater than Correct rejections (t(37) = -7.1, p < .001, d = 1.15), Hits were greater than 
Misses (t(21) = 9.31, p < .001, d = 1.98), Correct rejections were greater than Misses (t(21) = 
5.63, p < .001, d = 1.2), Correct rejections did not differ from False alarms (t(19) = 2.22, p = 
.231, d = 0.5),  and False alarms did not differ from Misses (t(14) = 1.25, p = 1, d = 0.32). This 





performance, since for the majority of trials they gave greater CJs when they were correct than 
incorrect. 
The same ANOVA was run on mean Test Response Time. There was no significant main 
effect of Response type (F(3, 30) = 2.47, MSe = 0.48, p =.081, η
2
p = .2), no main effect of Pair 
Type (F(1, 10) < 1), and no significant interaction (F(3, 30) < 1). Because there was a trend for a 
main effect of Response type, we still performed all comparisons using paired sample t-tests with 
a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. The analysis showed that Correct rejections were greater 
than Hits (t(37) = -7.1, p < .001, d = .84), Hits did not differ from False alarms (t(16) = 2.72, p = 
.091, d = .66) or Misses (t(18) = -1.63, p = .72, d = .37), False alarms did not differ from Correct 
rejections (t(15) = -1.66, p = .708, d = .42) or Misses (t(7) = 1.32, p = 1, d = .47), and Correct 
rejections did not differ from Misses (t(17) = 0.27, p = 1, d = .06). Ultimately, the analysis 
showed that there were no large differences in response times at test, except that participants did 
respond faster when they were correct on intact trials compared to rearranged trials.  
Performance x Metacognition 
To examine the accuracy of JOLs we ran gamma correlations using JOLs given at study 
and their corresponding performance at test. Both Pictures (M = .35, SD = .44) and Words (M = 
.35, SD = .52) had relatively low gamma correlations. Once again demonstrating that participants 
had low accuracy when predicting their future performance based on their study. 
To examine the accuracy of CJs, we again measured the gamma correlations but analyzed 
intact and rearranged pairs separately. For intact trials both Picture (M = .76, SD = .28) and Word 
pairs (M = .76, SD = .3) had high correlations, while for rearranged trials both Picture (M = .27, 





previous experiments where participants were overall accurate at judging their performance on 
intact trials but not rearranged trials. 
Discussion 
We replicated the picture superiority effect in associative memory previously found 
between picture and word pairs (Hockley, 2008). In contrast to previous demonstrations of the 
picture superiority effect in associative recognition, the effect was demonstrated as a mirror 
effect, where picture pairs had higher hit rates but lower false alarm rates compared to word 
pairs. The reason for the difference observed in the false alarm rates is not known. However, as 
in previous research, pictures had better discriminability compared to word pairs. Similar to 
Experiment 2, there were no differences in metacognitive behavior at study as participants gave 
similar JOLs and study time to picture and word pairs. This suggests that participants considered 
picture and word pairs to be equally difficult to remember. Unlike Experiment 2, participants 
showed no differences in CJs or response time at test for pictures and words, suggesting that they 
considered their memory for pictures and words to be equal. This corresponds to their 
metacognitive behavior at study. In terms of their performance, participants tended to give higher 
CJs when they were correct than incorrect. However, the only difference in reaction time was 
that they were faster to respond when they were correct on intact trials compared to rearranged 
trials. 
Looking at the correlation between memory performance and metacognition, JOLs were 
again not very accurate and CJs again showed a discrepancy between intact and rearranged trials. 
For CJs, the pattern was similar to Experiment 2, where correlations seemed to be consistent for 
picture and word pairs, suggesting that this stimulus manipulation also did not affect the 






 In terms of performance on an associative recognition test, the results of the experiments 
presented in this chapter generally followed patterns that were expected based on previous 
findings. In Experiment 1, we found a concordant effect when comparing compound word pairs 
to low strength word pairs and when comparing high strength word pairs to low strength word 
pairs. Compound and high strength word pairs had higher hit rates and false alarm rates 
compared to low strength pairs, which resulted in equivalent discriminability among the three 
pair types. In Experiment 2, there was a mirror effect when comparing concrete word pairs to 
abstract word pairs, where concrete word pairs had higher hit rates, lower false alarm rates, and 
better discriminability compared to abstract word pairs. These results show a clear advantage for 
concrete word pairs in terms of associative recognition memory compared to abstract word pairs. 
In Experiment 3, we found another mirror effect when comparing picture pairs to unrelated word 
pairs, where picture pairs had higher hit rates, lower false alarm rates, and better discriminability 
compared to unrelated word pairs. Aside from the false alarm rates being lower for picture pairs, 
the results were expected and showed an advantage for picture pairs over unrelated word pairs 
for associative recognition memory. 
  Considering the results of the JOLs across all three experiments, a few findings become 
apparent. First, JOLs were generally poor indicators of performance on the associative 
recognition tests. This is evident by the low gamma scores across all three experiments, which 
suggests that stimulus manipulations did not affect the accuracy of JOLs. This in line with 
previous research on JOLs for item memory (Watier & Collin, 2012) and cued recall of paired 
associates (Mueller et al., 2013). Second, somewhat surprisingly, across all of the stimulus 





ratings, where compound word pairs and high strength words pairs which have an existing 
association before being studied were given higher JOLs than word pairs with low associative 
strength. This finding corresponds to previous research on JOLs for paired associates where 
related word pairs are given higher JOLs than unrelated word pairs (Undorf & Erdfelder, 2015; 
Hertzog et al., 2002). 
 Third, contrary to previous research concreteness did not affect general JOL scores, nor 
did pictures pairs compared to unrelated word pairs. This was surprising, especially considering 
the advantage that both of these manipulations provided in terms of associative recognition. The 
lack of differences in JOLs may indicate a belief that the stimulus manipulations would not have 
an effect on the outcome of their study in terms of associative recognition. Alternatively, JOLs as 
a measurement of metacognitive sensitivity may be poor at indicating the effects of stimulus 
manipulations considering the fact that they were quite inaccurate at predicting performance on 
the recognition test. 
 Interestingly, we found no differences in study time among any of the stimulus 
manipulations in all three experiments. It was expected that study time would at least mirror the 
JOL ratings as it has been found with previous research (Soderstrom & McCabe, 2011), however 
even as an independent metacognitive measure it was expected that study time should have 
increased for stimulus that is more difficult to remember (Metcalfe, 2002; Nelson & Leonesio, 
1988). Therefore, it was surprising that low strength word pairs, abstract word pairs and 
unrelated word pairs were not studied for longer than other pair types given that participants had 
the choice to study items for as long as they wanted, and the test results showed that these pair 
types were more difficult to remember. Considering both JOLs and study time together it seems 





 The metacognitive measures at test demonstrated a similar neglect for stimulus 
manipulations. The only difference in CJs across all the stimulus manipulations was during 
Experiment 1 where CJs were higher for high strength word pairs compared to low strength word 
pairs. Stimulus manipulation made no other difference in CJ ratings nor in test reaction time. 
These results suggest participants treated all item pairs equally when making confident 
judgments and responses at test, at least in terms of the stimulus characteristics. 
 Where CJs showed a discrepancy was in terms of their accuracy for intact and rearranged 
pair types. CJs for intact pairs were highly accurate, whereas CJs for rearranged pair types had 
low accuracy. Considering the vast difference in these types of items it is highly likely that intact 
and rearranged pairs were handled differently by the participants when they were deciding 
whether an item was old or new. It follows from a dual process approach to associative 
recognition memory that intact pairs can be based on familiarity with a high degree of 
confidence considering that recognition for either item in a pair or for the association would 
result in an old response which would be correct. Whereas decisions on a rearranged pair if 
based on a recall-to-reject process where recollection of one of the items in a pair would be used 
to provide conflicting information which would result in either an old response if no information 
was found or a new response if information was found. With the low accuracy scores for CJs 
made for rearranged pairs it seems likely that confidence at test was not made as a result of a 
recall-to-reject process but rather familiarity which would explain the generally high CJ ratings 
but low accuracy. 
 The CJ correlations were generally supported by the CJ data on the different types of 
response measures at test. In all three experiments, CJs were highest following a hit but the other 





corresponds to the high accuracy for intact pairs. The pattern of CJs and response times for the 
other types of measures was not reliable across the three experiments in order to provide any 
insight on the different types of associative recognition responses. 
 One interesting comparison is that of JOLs and CJs with criterion placement. In 
Experiment 1, compound and high strength pairs had a liberal bias whereas low strength pairs 
had a conservative bias. Compound and high strength pairs then had higher JOLs compared to 
low strength pairs and high strength pairs had higher CJs compared to low strength pairs. These 
results suggest that these two different measures capture similar behavior in how participants 
treat these different pair types. The conservative bias and low JOL scores for low strength pairs 
may explain why they were slightly more accurate in terms of predictability for test performance. 
Less compelling evidence that these two measures demonstrate similar behavior patterns was 
found in Experiments 2 and 3 where no biases were found for the different stimulus 
manipulations and no differences were found in JOLs or CJs. It would be interesting to see if 
criterion corresponds to metacognitive judgments under different circumstances when these 
measures do vary. 
 The three experiments presented in this chapter set out to explore the relation between 
metamemory and associative recognition memory. The set of experiments were successful in 
demonstrating a different set of results in terms of associative recognition performance. The 
corresponding metamemory measures showed that metamemory behavior was largely insensitive 
to the stimulus manipulations even though they had effects on memory performance. In the next 
chapter, we attempted to examine this relation from a different perspective. Specifically, we 
looked at whether experience with the experimental paradigm had any effects, whether 





would have any effects. Unlike the three experiments presented in this chapter, the changes in 
procedure for the experiments in the next chapter were designed to explicitly have an effect on 
study or response behavior. In addition, the next experiments included stimulus manipulations 






Chapter 3: Experiments IV-VI 
Experiment 4 
Metacognitive monitoring can have an impact on our behavior during a memory task in a 
multitude of ways. The process of monitoring our memory while we learn new information has 
an active role in determining when learning needs to continue, when it can be terminated, or 
when a new strategy needs to be implemented. The experiments presented in Chapter 2 
demonstrated numerous ways in which we monitor associative memory, such as through self-
assessments, with study time allocation, or when our biases and beliefs about our own memory 
affect our learning. Our findings showed that often people failed to correctly account for 
important factors that affected their associative memory performance. Although participants 
identified differences in stimulus characteristics, which was evident when they were more 
confident in their ability to remember word pairs that were more concrete than abstract, this did 
not seem to change the way they studied the two pair types. Their general increased confidence 
in easier items than more difficult items (e.g., picture pairs compared to unrelated word pairs) 
also did not result in better accuracy for the individual items. Ultimately, study behavior 
throughout the first three experiments could be summarized as participants incorrectly 
monitoring the impact of differences in item characteristics on their future memory. 
In some ways metacognitive monitoring during the associative memory test was better in 
terms of the way participants accounted for various factors on their recognition memory. For 
instance, they were quite accurate at being able to rate their confidence when responding on pairs 
that were previously studied. However, this was in direct contrast to their accuracy in rating their 
confidence for new pairs that had not been previously studied. This dichotomy in behavior for 





memory, where old pairs can be identified with high confidence solely based on a fast 
familiarity-type process, whereas new pairs require recollection of specific information about the 
individual items in a pair or the associative information in order to be confidently identified. This 
recollection process is slower and requires specific details about a past event. It also takes more 
effort to do, which may have resulted in participants using it less and therefore lacking accurate 
confidence ratings in their response to new pairs. Similar to study behavior, participants rated 
higher confidence in one type of test pair over another but they did not change their response 
behavior according to the type of test pair, such as taking longer to respond to a pair when they 
were less confident in their response. 
The goal of the next three experiments (Experiments 4, 5, and 6), which will be described 
in this chapter, was to examine factors that may directly change metacognitive behavior. The 
three experiments had a similar general procedure, where participants studied a list of pairs of 
items and then were tested on the list with a yes or no associative recognition memory test. All of 
the experiments included the following metacognitive measures: judgments of learning (JOLs) 
which were collected during study, study time allocation, confidence judgments (CJs) which 
were collected at test, and response latencies. First, we examined the role of experience on both 
metacognitive behavior or beliefs and associative recognition memory. Experiment 4 had 
participants study a list of compound word (CW) pairs and non-compound word (NCW) pairs, 
which was done to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 and those of Ahmad and Hockley 
(2014). JOLs were item-by-item JOLs where they were collected after each word pair had been 
studied. Confidence judgments were similarly collected after each response on the test had been 
given. Reaction time during the whole procedure was recorded, allowing for study time to be 





second study-test block. This second study-test block was performed on a different list of 
compound and non-compound word pairs. One potential effect of having performed one study-
test block is that participants would gain an understanding of how the stimulus manipulation 
differentially affects their associative recognition memory at test. In that case, we would expect 
that their JOLs for compound word pairs in the second block would decrease when compared to 
the first block. This would indicate that participants updated their metacognitive beliefs of how 
compound word pairs would be remembered based on their experience with them in an 
associative recognition memory task. It is also possible that experience with the associative 
memory task would have other effects on their behavior in the second block, such as changes in 
study time allocation between the different stimuli, different response latencies, and possibly 
improved performance on discriminability for CW pairs. 
Second, we examined the role of feedback and how knowing when a response was 
correct or incorrect might affect future behavior. Experiment 5 was quite similar to Experiment 4 
including the same stimulus list and the inclusion of a second study-test block. The unique 
addition to Experiment 5 was that both after making a response on a test item and giving a CJ 
rating, participants were given feedback on whether their response was correct or incorrect. 
Because we were only interested in how feedback affected behavior during the second block, it 
was only given during the first test phase in Block 1. Feedback is an important diagnostic tool for 
learning new information as it allows us to correct our perceptions of when information is 
learned versus when it is not. Feedback on a memory task is not as beneficial as for example on a 
learning task, however it has been shown to improve metacognitive rating accuracy (Carpenter et 
al., 2019; Sharp et al., 1988), although not always (e.g., Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002). We expected 





feedback may improve metacognitive monitoring and control and possibly improve 
discriminability for more difficult items. 
Third, we examined one of the well-known methods of improving JOL rating accuracy, 
which is to delay the time after an item is studied and when a JOL rating is given. In Experiment 
6, the procedure was similar to the previous two experiments except that there was only one 
study-test block and the stimuli changed from compound and non-compound word pairs to 
concrete and abstract word pairs. This allowed for a replication of the results of Experiment 2, 
previously reported in Chapter 2. The unique aspect of Experiment 6 was that instead of 
collecting immediate trial-by-trial JOLs, we asked participants to give delayed-JOLs. Delayed-
JOLs were collected after the entire study list had finished being studied, where participants were 
presented with the study list again and made a JOL for each word pair. While immediate JOLs 
have been demonstrated to be poorly correlated to test performance, delayed-JOLs have been 
shown to significantly improve the accuracy of JOLs (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). The marked 
improvement in accuracy for delayed-JOLs has been demonstrated to be a result of differences in 
metacognitive ratings rather than improvements in actual memory performance. (Tauber et al., 
2015). We expected that delayed-JOLs would be more accurate than immediate JOLs, regardless 
of the type of word pair. 
Overall, the purpose of Experiments 4, 5, and 6 was to examine whether significant 
procedural changes would impact metacognitive behavior. Whereas in the first three experiments 
reported in Chapter 2 which simply changed the stimulus manipulations, the three experiments in 
this chapter were designed with the intention of having positive effects on participants’ study 





examined first, as the initial experiment that looked at how experience with an associative 
recognition memory task might affect metacognitive behavior or memory performance. 
Method 
Participants 
 Twenty-seven participants took part in Experiment 4. For the three experiments presented 
in this chapter all participants were enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Wilfrid 
Laurier University. No basic demographic information (age and gender) was collected from the 
participants; however, we are not aware of any effects of age or gender differences in young 
adults that affect recognition memory. We used corrected recognition scores (hit rate – false 
alarm rate) to determine exclusion from further analysis, this resulted in data from four 
participants being excluded from the analysis of Experiment 4 due to low corrected recognition 
scores (<= 0.15). The remaining data from 23 participants was used for analysis of Experiment 4. 
Regardless of inclusion in the data analysis, all participants received course credit in exchange 
for their participation. 
Materials 
 The experiment was conducted on an IBM-compatible PC computer with a 17-in. LCD 
monitor housed in an individual cubicle and using SuperLab 5.0 software (Cedrus, San Pedro, 
CA). There were a total of 192 word pairs, presented in Gills Sans MT, style-Regular, color-
black, size 28 font on a white background, with 10 spaces in between the two words. All of the 
compound word pairs were the same as those used by Ahmad and Hockley (2014). The non-
compound words were obtained from the MRC Psycholinguistic database (Coltheart, 1981) and 





= 549.07, SD = 49.9), word frequency (M = 102.13, SD = 180.38), and number of letters (M = 
4.29, SD = 0.89) (see Appendix B for list of word pairs). 
Procedure 
 The experiment was completed by each participant individually in a small cubicle. The 
experiment began with a set of instructions for the first study phase. The entire experiment was 
self-paced, where participants pressed the spacebar key to progress. The first study phase was 
composed of 96 trials, with each trial containing a word pair and a JOL rating. Word pairs were 
presented in the middle of the screen and lasted until the participant pressed the spacebar to 
indicate that they were done studying that particular pair. Study time was measures as the time 
taken between a word pair being presented on the screen and the spacebar being pressed in 
milliseconds (ms). Once participants finished studying a word pair they gave a corresponding 
JOL rating between 1 and 100, where 1 indicated that “You do not think you will remember the 
word pair at all”, and 100 indicated that “You will definitely remember the word pair”. 
Participants were encouraged to make use of the entire range of the scale. A display box showed 
their response and allowed them to make any corrections. Three trials at the beginning and three 
trials at the end of the study list were used to reduce primacy and recency effects and were not 
analyzed. Of the remaining 90 trials, half had compound word pairs and half had non-compound 
words pairs, but they were presented in a completely random order for each participant. 
Participants could take a short break after completing the study phase and before starting the test 
phase. 
 The first test phase was composed of 60 trials. Each trial was self-paced and contained a 
word pair and a CJ rating. For the test, the task for participants was to indicate whether a word 





the “n” key to indicate no. Half the test list had compound word pairs and half had non-
compound word pairs. Additionally, half of the test list were intact trials (appeared the same as 
on the study list) and half were rearranged trials. Rearranged pairs were made by using two study 
list pairs, the left-side word of one pair was used with the right-side word of another pair; left-
right side location and pair type remained the same (i.e., a new Compound word pair was made 
from two previous Compound pairs). After making a response, they were immediately prompted 
for a CJ rating between 1 and 10, where 1 indicated that “You have no idea whether your 
response is correct or not”, and 10 indicated that “You are absolutely certain that your response 
is correct”. The test list was presented in a completely random order which was different for each 
participant. Response latencies were measured by recording the interval between a test pair first 
appearing on screen and when a response key was pressed. 
 The first test phase was complete when participants finished responding to the entire test 
list. They were then allowed to take a short break if they wanted to before starting the second 
block. The procedure for the second block was identical to the first block. Block 2 also had 
different study and test lists. 
Results 
Recognition performance 
The descriptive statistics for hit rates (HR), false alarm rates (FAR), d’, and C can be 
found in Table 10. We first ran a 2 (Probe Type: HR vs. FAR) x 2 (Pair Type: CW vs. NCW) x 2 
(Block: 1 vs. 2) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)11 with proportion of old 
responses as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of Probe Type (F(1, 22) = 247.25, 
MSe = 0.06, p < .001, η
2
p = .92), with HR being greater than FAR, a main effect of Pair Type 
 
11 For all three experiments, if a repeated measures ANOVA was used then the assumption of sphericity was tested 





(F(1, 22) = 19.51, MSe = 0.02, p < .001, η
2
p = .47), with CW being greater than NCW, no main 
effect of Block (F(1, 22) < 1), no Pair Type x Probe Type interaction (F(1, 22) = 1.04, MSe = 
0.02, p = .32, η2p = .05), no Pair Type x Block interaction (F(1, 22) = 3.16, MSe = 0.01, p = .09, 
η2p = .13), no Probe Type x Block interaction (F(1, 22) < 1), and no Pair Type x Probe Type x 
Block interaction (F(1, 22) = 3.43, MSe = 0.01, p = .08, η
2
p = .14). 
Table 10 
Descriptive Statistics for Associative Recognition Performance Measures by Pair Type for 
Experiment 4. 
 
 This pattern of means is consistent with a concordant effect (higher HR and higher FAR) 








 Block 1 Block 2 








HR .88 (.11) .76 (.15) .87 (.12) .74 (.17) 
FAR .33 (.22) .20 (.16) .27 (.20) .24 (.16) 
d’ 1.85 (.78) 1.77 (.77) 2.03 (.83) 1.59 (.89) 






Mean Hits and False Alarms for Each Pair Type and Block in Experiment 4. The error bars 
represent standard deviations of the means.  
 
A 2 (Pair Type: CW vs. NCW) x 2 (Block: 1 vs. 2) repeated measures ANOVA was 
performed on d’. There was no main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 22) = 2.48, MSe = 0.64, p = .13, 
η2p = .1), no main effect of Block (F(1, 22) < 1), and no significant interaction (F(1, 22) = 3.01, 
MSe = 0.26, p = .1, η
2
p = .12). This is in line with the concordant effect mentioned previously, as 
the decrease in both HR and FAR for NCW pairs compared CW pairs resulted in equal d’ values. 
To examine C we performed one sample t-tests to see if they differed from zero and found that 
CW pairs had a significant liberal bias (Block 1: t(22) = -4.8, p < .001, d = 1; Block 2: t(22) = -
2.86, p = .009, d = 0.6), while NCW pairs had no bias (Block 1: t(22) = 0.93, p = .36, d = 0.19; 







One participant’s data were omitted from analyses of all of the metacognitive measures 
for failing to follow instructions. Specifically, the participant gave the same CJ for the majority 
of test trials. 
Study 
The means and standard deviations for JOLs and Study Time can be found in Table 11. 
We ran a 2 (Pair Type: CW vs. NCW) x 2 (Block: 1 vs. 2) repeated measures ANOVA on mean 
JOL and found a main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 21) = 85.69, MSe = 234.69, p < .001, η
2
p = .8), 
where CW was greater than NCW, no main effect of Block (F(1, 21) = 2.54, MSe = 64.97, p = 
.126, η2p = .11), and no significant interaction (F(1, 21) = 2.83, MSe = 24.88, p = .108, η
2
p = .12). 
The same ANOVA was run on mean Study Time12; there was a main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 
20) = 21.44, MSe = 5.68, p < .001, η
2
p = .52), a main effect of Block (F(1, 20) = 17.1, MSe = 
5.91, p < .001, η2p = .46), and a significant interaction (F(1, 20) = 10.92, MSe = 1.89, p = .004, 
η2p = .35). 
To examine the interaction we ran all comparisons using paired sample t-tests with a 
Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. Study time for CW pairs remained the same from Block 1 
to Block 2 (t(21) = 2.84, p = .059, d = 0.6), whereas study time decreased for NCW pairs from 




12 Extreme outliers were identified – and removed – using boxplot methods as values above Q3 + (1.5xIQR) or 
below Q1 – (1.5xIQR), where Q1 and Q3 are the first and third quartiles, respectively, and IQR is the interquartile 







Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures (Mean JOLs and Study Time in sec.) by Pair 
Type for Experiment 4. 
 
Test 
The means and standard deviations for CJs and Test Response Time can be found in 
Table 12. We ran a 4 (Response Type: Hits vs. False alarms vs. Correct rejections vs. Misses) x 2 
(Pair Type: CW vs. NCW) x 2 (Block: 1 vs. 2) repeated measures ANOVA with mean CJ as the 
dependent variable. There was a main effect of Response Type (F(1.82, 9.08) = 10.17, MSe = 
6.48, p = .005, η2p = .67), no main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 5) = 2.75, MSe = 4.7, p = .158, η
2
p = 
.36), no main effect of Block (F(1, 5) < 1), a Pair Type x Block interaction (F(1, 5) = 9.32, MSe = 
0.13, p = .028, η2p = .65), a Pair Type x Response Type interaction (F(3, 15) = 3.49, MSe = 2.4, p 
= .042, η2p = .41), no Block x Response Type interaction (F(3, 15) < 1), and no Pair Type x 















JOLs 71.51 (17.66) 39.48 (18.90) 72.46 (14.89) 44.01 (20.18) 






Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures at Test (Mean CJs and Response Time in sec.) 
by Pair Type and Probe Type for Experiment 4. 










CJs     
CW 9.13 (0.73) 7.07 (2.30) 7.18 (1.41) 5.74 (2.27) 
NCW 8.14 (1.26) 5.97 (1.98) 7.29 (1.47) 5.19 (2.18) 
Response Time     
CW 2.59 (1.11) 3.81 (2.21) 3.69 (1.28) 3.17 (1.29) 
NCW 3.11 (1.38) 4.55 (2.36) 3.69 (1.19) 3.26 (1.73) 
Block 2 
CJs     
CW 8.80 (1.16) 7.14 (2.38) 6.94 (1.79) 6.03 (2.50) 
NCW 7.87 (1.69) 5.71 (2.45) 6.92 (1.92) 5.37 (2.07) 
Response Time     
CW 1.92 (0.91) 2.83 (1.34) 3.15 (1.56) 2.51 (1.30) 
NCW 2.58 (0.90) 3.51 (1.62) 2.95 (1.65) 3.30 (1.79) 
 
For the Pair Type x Block interaction we collapsed across Response Type then ran two 
one-way ANOVAs for each Block with Pair Type (CW vs. NCW) as a within-subjects factor. 
There was a significant effect of Pair Type at Block 1 (F(1, 42) = 4.51, MSe = 1.55, p = .04, η
2
p = 
.1) where CJs for CW pairs was greater than CJs for NCW pairs, and no effect of Pair Type at 
Block 2 (F(1, 42) = 2.58, MSe = 2.66, p = .119, η
2





For the Pair Type x Response Type interaction we collapsed across Block then for each 
separate Pair Type we analyzed all comparisons using paired sample t-tests with a Bonferroni 
adjustment to the p values. For CW Hits were greater than False Alarms ((t(21) = -4.8, p < .001, 
d = 1.02), Hits were greater than Correct Rejections (t(21) = -7.83, p < .001, d = 1.67), Hits were 
greater than Misses (t(16) = 5.99, p < .001, d = 1.45), False Alarms did not differ from Correct 
Rejections (t(21) = -0.19, p = 1, d = 0.04), False Alarms did not differ from Misses (t(16) = 2.01, 
p = .37, d = 0.49), and Correct Rejections did not differ from Misses (t(16) = 2.06, p = .334, d = 
0.5). These results indicate that for CW pair types participants’ confidence only increased for 
intact pairs when they were correct.  
For NCW Hits were greater than False Alarms (t(19) = -7.78, p < .001, d = 1.74), Hits 
were greater than Correct Rejections (t(21) = -3.8, p = .006, d = 0.81), Hits were greater than 
Misses (t(20) = 7.27, p < .001, d = 1.59), Correct Rejections were greater than False Alarms 
(t(19) = 3.31, p = .004, d = 0.74), Correct Rejections were greater than Misses (t(20) = 4.54, p = 
.001, d = 0.99), and False Alarms did not differ from Misses (t(18) = 1.29, p = 1, d = 0.3). 
Participants’ confidence for NCW pair types increased for both intact and rearranged pairs when 
they were correct. 
The same repeated measures ANOVA that was used for CJs was run on mean Test 
Response Time. There was a main effect of Response Type (F(3, 9) = 4.21, MSe = 0.64, p = .041, 
η2p = .58), no main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 3) = 3.24, MSe = 2.69, p = .17, η
2
p = .52), no main 
effect of Block (F(1, 3) = 9.4, MSe = 0.98, p = .055, η
2
p = .76), no Pair Type x Block interaction 
(F(1, 3) = 3.75, MSe = 0.08, p = .148, η
2
p = .56), no Pair Type x Response Type interaction (F(3, 
9) = 1.33, MSe = 1.15, p = .323, η
2
p = .31), no Block x Response Type interaction (F(3, 9) < 1), 





For the main effect of Response Type a post-hoc analysis was performed on all 
comparisons using paired sample t-tests with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. False 
alarms were greater than Hits (t(29) = 3.63, p = .006, d = 0.66), Correct Rejections were greater 
than Hits (t(43) = 5.45, p < .001, d = 0.82), False Alarms did not differ from Correct Rejections 
(t(29) = -0.56, p = 1, d = 0.1), False Alarms did not differ from Misses (t(14) = 0.75, p = 1, d = 
0.19), Correct Rejections did not differ from Misses (t(22) = 0.74, p = 1, d = 0.15), and Misses 
did not differ from Hits (t(22) = -2, p = .351, d = 0.42). Overall, participants were generally 
quickest to respond after a Hit, while response times were equal following a Miss, a Correct 
Rejection, and a False Alarm. 
Performance x Metacognition 
To look at the accuracy of JOLs we ran gamma correlations using JOLs given at study 
and their corresponding performance at test for both Blocks for each pair type13. For Block 1 
both CW (M = .14, SD = .49) and NCW (M = .3, SD = .38) pairs had low gamma correlations. 
Interestingly, for Block 2 CW pairs (M = .38, SD = .67) stayed low while NCW pairs (M = .11, 
SD = .58) had no correlation. This suggests participants were not very accurate at predicting their 
performance when prompted immediately after study. 
To examine the accuracy of CJs, we once again used gamma correlations but analyzed 
Intact and Rearranged pairs separately as well as Block 1 and 2 separately. For Block 1 Intact 
pairs, both CW (M = .78, SD = .25) and NCW (M = .65, SD = .38) had moderate to high 
correlations, while Rearranged pairs for NCW (M = .45, SD = .45) had low correlations and CW 
(M = .03, SD = .52) had no correlation. The same pattern emerged for Block 2. Intact pairs for 
CW (M = .65, SD = .55) and NCW (M = .59, SD = .44) had moderate correlations, Rearranged 
 
13 Trial-by-trial JOLs collected at study ask for a judgment of future performance, therefore the accuracy of a JOL 





pairs for NCW (M = .43, SD = .44) had low correlations, and CW (M = -.07, SD = .44) had no 
correlation. Overall participants were accurate at judging their performance on intact trials but 
not rearranged trials and an additional second study-test block had no effect. 
Discussion 
 We found a concordant Compound Word effect for compound word pairs compared to 
non-compound words pairs. This directly replicated the recognition results of Experiment 1 in 
Chapter 2 and the effect found by Ahmad and Hockley (2014), while also finding that d’ did not 
differ between the two word pairs types. This pattern of results remained consistent from Block 1 
to Block 2. In terms of metacognitive measures, during the first study block participants gave 
higher JOLs to compound word pairs and studied them for less amount of time compared to non-
compound word pairs. For the second study block participants continued to give compound word 
pairs higher JOLs, but they studied them for the same amount of time as non-compound word 
pairs. During test, participants were more confident in their responses for compound word pairs 
than non-compound word pairs in Block 1 and Block 2. Only in Block 2 did participants also 
respond to compound word pairs faster than non-compound word pairs. In terms of correctness, 
hits generally had higher CJs and were responded to faster than other types of trials. 
 When considering participants’ memory performance and metacognitive measures 
together, JOLs were not very accurate at predicting future performance. This remained true even 
with an addition of a second study-test block. Therefore practice with this associative recognition 
memory task did not help to increase accuracy of immediate JOLs, in fact accuracy got worse for 
non-compound word pairs. The accuracy of CJs demonstrated a discrepancy between intact and 





to zero accuracy. An addition of a second study-test block also had no effect on this pattern of 
results. 
Experiment 5 
In Experiment 4 we found that when participants were given experience with the memory 
task, by having an additional study-test block, they demonstrated no meaningful differences in 
any of the behavioral measures that we used. We expected that after taking the associative 
recognition test participants may have become aware of the difficulty of discriminating between 
intact and rearranged compound word pairs and decide to change their study behavior. What we 
found from our measures of study time allocation and JOL ratings, is that participants remained 
consistent with their belief that compound word pairs would be easier to remember than non-
compound word pairs. One of the reasons why experience with the memory task did not affect 
any of the behavioral measures in Block 2 may have been because participants were not able to 
accurately monitor their performance on the first test phase. Participants were not told if the 
response they gave on a test trial was correct or incorrect, therefore they may not have been 
aware that compound word pairs had high hits but also high false alarms. In Experiment 5, we 
decided to give participants feedback during the first test phase after they gave a response and 
after they already gave a CJ rating. This ensured that their CJ ratings would not be influenced by 
the information that they were correct or incorrect, but rather was only based on their ability to 







Thirty participants took part in Experiment 5. Data from five participants was excluded 
because of their low corrected recognition scores. The remaining data from 25 participants was 
used for the analysis of Experiment 5. 
Materials 
The materials were identical to those of Experiment 4 (see Appendix B for list of word 
pairs). 
Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 5 was the same as Experiment 4, with the exception that 
during Block 1 participants were given feedback on whether their responses were correct or 
incorrect. A feedback slide with “correct” in green font appeared only after they gave their CJ 
rating and if they gave the correct response. Similarly, a feedback slide with “incorrect” in red 
font appeared only after their CJ rating and if they gave an incorrect response. The feedback 
slide remained on screen until they pressed the spacebar key to move on. Feedback was not 
given in the test phase of Block 2. 
Results 
Recognition performance 
The descriptive statistics for hit rates (HR), false alarm rates (FAR), d’, and C can be 
found in Table 13. We first ran a 2 (Probe Type: HR vs FAR) x 2 (Pair Type: CW vs. NCW) x 2 
(Block: 1 vs. 2) Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with proportion of old 
responses as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 24) = 29.7, MSe 
= 0.01, p < .001, η2p = .55) where CW pairs were greater than NCW pairs, a main effect of Probe 
Type (F(1, 24) = 736.92, MSe = 0.02, p < .001, η
2
p = .97) where HR was greater than FAR, no 





= 0.01, p = .298, η2p = .05), no Pair Type x Block interaction (F(1, 24) = 1.13, MSe = .01, p = 
.249, η2p = .06), no Probe Type x Block interaction (F(1, 24) = 2.8, MSe = .01, p = .107, η
2
p = .1), 
and no Pair Type x Probe Type x Block interaction (F(1, 24) < 1). 
Table 13 
Descriptive Statistics for Associative Recognition Performance Measures by Pair Type for 
Experiment 5. 
 
We performed a 2 (Pair Type: CW vs. NCW) x 2 (Block: 1 vs. 2) repeated measures 
ANOVA on d’ and found no main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 24) = 1.1, MSe = .4, p = .305, η
2
p = 
.04), no main effect of Block (F(1, 24) = 3.06, MSe = .26, p = .093, η
2
p = .11), and no significant 
interaction (F(1, 24) < 1). This is consistent with a concordant effect (higher HR and higher 
FAR) for CW compared to NCW pairs which resulted in equivalent discriminability (see Figure 
7). To examine C we performed one sample t-tests to see if they criterion estimates differed from 
zero. CW pairs in both Block 1 (t(24) = -3.58, p = .002, d = 0.72) and Block 2 (t(24) = -3.23, p = 
.004, d = 0.65) had liberal bias. NCW pairs at Block 1 (t(24) = 0.65, p = .52, d = 0.13) had no 
bias, but at Block 2 (t(24) = 2.09, p = .047, d = .42) had a conservative bias. 
 
 Block 1 Block 2 








HR .87 (.08) .78 (.13) .85 (.12) .72 (.15) 
FAR .26 (.12) .20 (.13) .28 (.14) .19 (.12) 
d’ 1.93 (.52) 1.85 (.71) 1.81 (.60) 1.62 (.70) 






Mean Hits and False Alarms for Each Pair Type and Block in Experiment 5. The error bars 




The means and standard deviations for JOLs and Study Time can be found in Table 14. 
We ran a 2 (Pair Type: CW vs. NCW) x 2 (Block: 1 vs. 2) repeated measures ANOVA with 
mean JOL as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 24) = 189.76, 
MSe = 103.78, p < .001, η
2
p = .89) where JOLs were higher for CW pairs than NCW pairs, no 
main effect of Block (F(1, 24) = 3.52, MSe = 87.19, p = .073, η
2
p = .13), and no significant 
interaction (F(1, 24) < 1). The same ANOVA was run on mean Study Time; there was a main 
effect of Pair Type (F(1, 21) = 31.47, MSe = 1.87, p < .001, η
2





21) = 36.68, MSe = 6, p < .001, η
2
p = .64), and a significant interaction (F(1, 21) = 7.49, MSe = 
0.74, p = .001, η2p = .26).  
Table 14 
Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures (Mean JOLs and Study Time in sec) by Pair 
Type for Experiment 5. 









JOLs 64.24 (18.48) 36.90 (16.91) 68.46 (13.49) 39.68 (19.98) 
Study Time 5.66 (3.71) 6.74 (3.60) 2.01 (0.71) 3.04 (1.43) 
 
To examine the interaction, two separate One-way ANOVAs were performed for each 
Block, with Pair Type (CW vs. NCW) as a within-subjects factor. There was no main effect at 
Block 1 (F(1, 45) = 1.02, MSe = 13.4, p = .318, η
2
p = .02), but there was a main effect at Block 2 
(F(1, 48) = 10.56, MSe = 1.28, p = .002, η
2
p = .18), where Study Time was greater for NCW than 
CW. 
Test 
The means and standard deviations for CJs and Test Response Time can be found in 
Table 15. We ran a 4 (Response Type: Hits vs. False alarms vs. Correct Rejections vs. Misses) x 
2 (Pair Type: CW vs. NCW) x 2 (Block: 1 vs. 2) repeated measures ANOVA with mean CJ as 
the dependent variable. There was a main effect of Response Type (F(3, 21) = 30.46, MSe = 1.83, 
p < .001, η2p = .81), a main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 7) = 7.13, MSe = 1.46, p = .032, η
2
p = .51) 
where CJs were higher for CW than NCW pairs, no main effect of Block (F(1, 7) < 1), no Pair 
Type x Block interaction (F(1, 7) = 2.41, MSe = 0.71, p = .165, η
2





Response Type interaction (F(3, 21) = 2.56, MSe = 0.76, p = .082, η
2
p = .27), no Block x 
Response Type interaction (F(3, 21) = 1.12, MSe = 1.52, p = .365, η
2
p = .14), and no Pair Type x 
Block x Response Type interaction (F(3, 21) = 1.40, MSe = .58, p = .27, η
2
p = .17). 
Table 15 
Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures at Test (mean CJs and Response Time in sec) 
by Pair Type and Probe Type for Experiment 5. 










CJs     
CW 8.90 (.92) 6.23 (2.12) 6.50 (1.54) 5.04 (2.14) 
NCW 7.89 (1.35) 5.70 (2.68) 6.28 (1.79) 4.87 (1.94) 
Response Time     
CW 2.46 (.54) 3.36 (1.29) 2.98 (.86) 2.76 (1.07) 
NCW 3.23 (.85) 4.13 (1.46) 3.34 (.99) 3.61 (.97) 
Block 2 
CJs     
CW 8.77 (.83) 6.38 (1.77) 6.11 (1.44) 5.56 (2.14) 
NCW 7.65 (1.32) 4.93 (2.06) 6.24 (1.64) 4.43 (1.64) 
Response Time     
CW 1.90 (.45) 2.91 (1.30) 2.68 (.90) 2.38 (1.15) 
NCW 2.48 (.54) 3.01 (0.92) 2.69 (.73) 2.86 (1.03) 
 
For the main effect of Response Type we ran a post-hoc analysis on all comparisons 
using paired sample t-tests with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. The analysis showed 





than Correct Rejections (t(49) = -13.92, p < .001, d = 1.97), Hits were greater than Misses (t(34) 
= 13.44, p < .001, d = 2.27), False alarms were greater than Misses (t(24) = 4.02, p = .003, d = 
0.8), Correct rejections were greater than Misses (t(34) = 5, p < .001, d = 0.85), and False Alarms 
did not differ from Correct Rejections (t(37) = 1.93, p = .364, d = 0.31). This pattern of results 
suggest that participants’ overall CJs were in line with their performance, since they gave greater 
CJs when they were correct than incorrect. 
The same ANOVA was run on mean Test Response Time; there was a main effect of 
Response Type (F(3, 21) = 8.67, MSe = 0.63, p < .001, η
2
p = .55), no main effect of Pair Type 
(F(1, 7) = 3.52, MSe = 1.32, p = .103, η
2
p = .34), no main effect of Block (F(1, 7) = 5.57, MSe = 
1.3, p = .05, η2p = .44), no Pair Type x Block interaction (F(1, 7) = 2.52, MSe = 0.83, p = .156, 
η2p = .27), no Pair Type x Response Type interaction (F(3, 21) < 1), no Block x Response Type 
interaction (F(3, 21) < 1), and no Pair Type x Block x Response Type interaction (F(3, 21) < 1). 
For the main effect of Response Type a post-hoc analysis on all comparisons was done 
using paired sample t-test with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. The analysis showed that 
False Alarms were greater than Hits (t(36) = 5.02, p < .001, d = 0.83), Correct Rejections were 
greater than Hits (t(48) = 3.49, p = .006, d = .5), False Alarms were greater than Correct 
rejections (t(36) = -3.48, p = .008, d = 0.57), Misses did not differ from Hits (t(32) = -1.3, p = 1, 
d = 0.23), False Alarms did not differ from Misses (t(23) = 1.15, p = 1, d = .24), and Correct 
Rejections did not differ from Misses (t(32) = -0.08, p = 1, d = 0.01). Overall participants 








Performance x Metacognition 
To look at the accuracy of JOLs we ran gamma correlations using JOLs given at study 
and their corresponding performance at test, independently for Block 1 and 2. In Block 1, JOLs 
for CW (M = -.04, SD = .67) had no correlation with test performance and JOLs for NCW (M = 
.19, SD = .51) had a low correlation with test performance. In Block 2, the accuracy of JOLs for 
both CW (M = .33, SD = .61) and NCW (M = .23, SD = 37) increased but remained low. 
To examine the accuracy of CJs, we once again used gamma correlations but analyzed 
Intact and Rearranged pairs and Block 1 and 2 separately. For Block 1 Intact pairs, both CW (M 
= .84, SD = .27) and NCW (M = .48, SD = .53) had moderate to high correlations, while for 
Rearranged trials CW pairs (M = .1, SD = .47) had no correlation with test performance and 
NCW (M = .28, SD = .61) had low correlations. The pattern remained consistent for Block 2: 
Intact CW (M = .76, SD = .45) and NCW (M = .68, SD = .32) pairs had moderate to high 
correlations, and Rearranged CW (M = .08, SD = .5) had no correlation with test performance 
and NCW (M = .37, SD = .5) had low correlations. 
Discussion 
 We replicated the concordant effect that we found in Experiment 4, where CW pairs had 
higher hit rates but also higher false alarm rates compared to NCW pairs. This resulted in 
discriminability between the two pair types being equal. An additional study-test block, where 
they were given feedback during the first test phase, did have some effects. For NCW pairs, 
participants went from no bias in the criterion estimates to a more conservative bias. There was 
also a bigger difference in study time in Block 2, where NCW pairs were studied longer than CW 
pairs. JOLs for CW pairs increased in absolute accuracy from Block 1, where they were zero, to 





high accuracy for both pairs types, and rearranged pairs, where accuracy was low or close to zero 
for both pair types. The additional study-test block had no effect on CJs. 
 Ultimately, adding a second block and providing feedback for responses in Block 1 did 
not have the expected effect on CW pairs. The measures taken at study suggest that participants 
treated CW pairs the same in Block 2 as they did in Block 1, and their belief that CW pairs 
would be easier to remember remained the same.  
Experiment 6 
 The previous two experiments were designed to give participants an opportunity to learn 
from their experience. Neither feedback nor an additional study-test block were found to improve 
performance or metacognitive behavior for CW pairs. In Experiment 6, we included delayed-
JOLs, which is a metacognitive measure that is well known to improve the absolute accuracy of 
JOL ratings. We expected that delayed-JOLs would be accurately correlated to test performance, 
regardless of pair type. The stimuli were also changed from compound and non-compound word 
pairs to concrete and abstract word pairs. This allowed for a replication of the results of 
Experiment 2, previously reported in Chapter 2. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-six participants took part in Experiment 6. The data from all of the participants 
was used in the analysis of Experiment 6. 
Materials 
There were 96 word pairs of two types: Concrete and Abstract. All words were obtained 
from the MRC Psycholinguistic database (Coltheart, 1981). Concrete words had a minimum 





concreteness value of 350 (M = 302.2, SD = 31.41). All words were equated for familiarity, 
imageability, word frequency, word length and number of syllables. Pairs were created by 
randomly putting two words of the same type together. All other materials were identical to those 
of Experiments 4 and 5 (see Appendix B for list of word pairs). 
Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 6 was similar to that of Experiments 4 and 5 with a few 
notable differences. First, there was only one study-test block. Second, the stimuli were 
composed of Concrete and Abstract word pairs. Similar to Experiment 5, participants were given 
feedback on whether their responses were correct or incorrect and they were told at the end of 
the test phase the total number of correct responses they made on the test. Lastly and most 
importantly, the JOLs were prompted after the entire study list had been completely studied 
rather than a JOL prompt after each pair was studied. After the study list was completely 
presented, participants were told that the study list would be presented again and that they would 
be asked to give a JOL rating for each pair one at a time. The word pairs were then presented 
again in the same format as the study list, but in a different random order. The JOL prompt was 
the same as Experiments 4 and 5, where a box appeared near the bottom of the screen and the 
participant could enter in their CJ and make any corrections. The study phase was complete after 
a JOL was given for every word pair. 
Results 
Recognition performance 
The descriptive statistics for hit rates (HR), false alarm rates (FAR), d’, and C can be 
found in Table 16. We first ran a 2 (Probe Type: HR vs. FAR) x 2 (Pair Type: Concrete vs. 





variable. There was a main effect of Probe Type (F(1, 25) = 222.75, MSe = 0.04, p < .001, η
2
p = 
.9) where HR was greater than FAR, no main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 25) < 1), and a significant 
interaction (F(1, 25) = 28.96, MSe = 0.01, p < .001, η
2
p = .54). 
Table 16 






HR .81 (.13) .71 (.12) 
FAR .15 (.13) .25 (.14) 
d’ 2.22 (1.05) 1.35 (.74) 
C .08 (.24) .07 (.30) 
 
To examine the interaction, we performed paired sample t-tests for each Pair Type by 
Probe Type, with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. Concrete pairs had a greater HR than 
Abstract pairs (t(25) = -3.95, p < .001, d = 0.78), and Abstract pairs had a greater FAR than 
Concrete pairs (t(25) = 3.4, p = .002, d = 0.67). This pattern demonstrated a mirror effect that is 













Mean Hits and False Alarms for Each Pair Type in Experiment 6. The error bars represent 
standard deviations of the means. 
 
We performed a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test for Pair Type (Concrete vs. Abstract) on d’ 
and found a significant effect (χ2(1) = 9.48, p = .002)14, where discrimination for Concrete pairs 
was greater than for Abstract pairs. To examine C we performed one sample t-tests to see if the 
criterion estimates differed from zero. Neither estimate for Concrete (t(25) = 1.66, p = .11, d = 
0.33) nor Abstract pairs (t(25) = 1.24, p = .23, d = 0.24) differed from zero, meaning both had no 
significant bias.  
 
 
14 A one-way ANOVA showed the same result (F(1, 50) = 12.03, MSe = 0.83, p = .001, η2p = .19), however the 







The means and standard deviations for JOLs and Study Time can be found in Table 17. 
For the JOLs we ran a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test with Pair Type (Concrete vs. Abstract) as a 
within-subjects factor15. There was no main effect (χ2(1) = 1.91, p = .167). We ran a one-way 
ANOVA on mean Study Time; there was no main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 44) < 1). 
Table 17 
Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures (Mean JOLs and Study Time in sec) by Pair 





JOLs 53.69 (23.32) 45.29 (22.64) 
Study time 2.80 (0.99) 3.04 (1.28) 
 
Test 
The means and standard deviations for CJs and Test Response Time can be found in 
Table 18. We ran a 4 (Response Type: Hits vs. False alarms vs. Correct Rejections vs. Misses) x 
2 (Pair Type: Concrete vs. Abstract) repeated measures ANOVA on the mean CJs. There was a 
main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 14) = 12.06, MSe = 2.35, p = .004, η2p = .46) where Concrete pairs 
were given higher CJs than Abstract pairs, a main effect of Response Type (F(3, 42) = 16.47, 
MSe = 1.46, p < .001, η2p = .54), and no significant interaction (F(1.8, 25.24) < 1). 
 
 
15 A one-way ANOVA showed the same result (F(1, 46) = 1.61, MSe = 528.1, p = .212, η2p = .03), however the 






Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures at Test (Mean CJs and Response Time in sec) 
by Pair Type and Probe Type for Experiment 6. 
 
For the main effect of Response Type a post-hoc analysis was done for all comparisons 
using paired sample t-tests with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. The analysis showed 
that Hits were greater than False Alarms (t(15) = -4.31, p = .004, d = 1.08), Hits were greater 
than Misses (t(16) = 6.73, p < .001, d = 1.63), Hits were greater than Correct Rejections (t(23) = 
-3.86, p = .005, d = 0.79), Correct Rejections were greater than Misses (t(16) = 8.09, p < .001, d 
= 1.96), Correct Rejections did not differ from False Alarms (t(15) = 2.91, p = .065, d = 0.73), 
and False Alarms did not differ from Misses (t(14) = 1.51, p = .912, d = 0.39). This pattern of 
results suggest that participants’ overall CJs were mostly in line with their performance, since for 
the majority of trials they gave greater CJs when they were correct than incorrect. 
The same ANOVA was run on mean Test Response Time; there was a main effect of Pair 
Type (F(1, 14) = 5.8, MSe = 0.5, p = .03, η2p = .29) where Concrete pairs were responded to 









CJs     
Concrete 9.07 (0.97) 6.84 (1.95) 8.74 (1.07) 6.65 (1.83) 
Abstract 8.33 (1.12) 6.10 (1.96) 7.13 (1.54) 5.75 (1.87) 
Response Time     
Concrete 2.73 (0.92) 3.00 (1.31) 3.00 (0.88) 2.79 (0.92) 





faster than Abstract pairs, no main effect of Response Type (F(3, 42) < 1), and no significant 
interaction (F(3, 42) = 1.5, MSe = 0.4, p = .229, η2p = .1). 
Performance x Metacognition 
To examine the accuracy of JOLs we ran gamma correlations on the delayed-JOLs given 
after study and their corresponding performance at test. Both Concrete (M = .45, SD = .38) and 
Abstract (M = .33, SD = .33) had low to moderate correlations. To examine the accuracy of CJs 
we once again used gamma correlations, but analyzed Intact and Rearranged pairs separately. 
For Intact pairs both Concrete (M = .71, SD = .44) and Abstract (M = .72, SD = .27) had 
moderate to high correlations, while for Rearranged pairs both Concrete (M = .32, SD = .65) and 
Abstract (M = .23, SD = .63) had low correlations. 
Discussion 
 We found a mirror effect, where concrete word pairs had higher hit rates but lower false 
alarm rates compared to abstract word pairs, replicating the pattern of associative recognition 
performance found in Experiment 2 in Chapter 2. Concrete word pairs also had better 
discriminability compared to abstract word pairs. Interestingly, there were no differences 
between the two pair types in terms of JOLs or study time allocation. At test, concrete word pairs 
were given higher CJs than abstract pairs. Participants gave higher CJs when they were correct 
on previously studied word pairs, this corresponds to the high accuracy of CJs on intact word 
pairs. CJs remained low for rearranged word pairs. The main finding for this experiment was that 
delayed JOLs did improve the absolute accuracy of JOLs compared to immediate JOLs. This is 
evident when comparing JOLs given in Experiment 2 from Chapter 2, where concrete pairs had 





of Delayed-JOLs resulted in improved absolute accuracy of concrete pairs to moderate 
correlations, while abstract pairs remained low.  
General Discussion 
The first two experiments presented in this chapter replicated the Concordant Compound 
word effect found previously in Experiment 1 of Chapter 2. Compound word pairs had higher hit 
rates and higher false alarm rates compared to non-compound word pairs, leading to no 
discriminability differences between the two. The addition of a second study-test block 
(Experiment 4) or feedback on the first test phase (Experiment 5) did not affect the associative 
recognition performance. The addition of a second block only resulted in the response bias for 
non-compound word pairs going from no bias to a conservative bias. These results demonstrate 
that participants treat compound word pairs and non-compound word pairs consistently even 
when given experience with the task and feedback when they are correct or incorrect on the 
associative recognition test. Experiment 6 replicated the mirror effect found previously in 
Experiment 2 of Chapter 2, where concrete word pairs had higher hit rates and lower false alarm 
rates compared to abstract word pairs, which led to better discriminability for concrete word 
pairs. This was expected as there was very little change in procedure between these two 
experiments. 
In terms of the metacognitive measures, participants gave higher JOLs for compound 
word pairs than non-compound word pairs indicating that they considered compound word pairs 
easier to study. The addition of a second block or feedback had no effects on JOLs. The pattern 
for JOLs was reflected in study time allocation, where non-compound word pairs were studied 
longer than compound word pairs in Block 1 of Experiment 5, whereas non-compound word 





suggest that when given feedback during the first test phase participants decided to give non-
compound word pairs more focus when studying, however this did not seem to have any effect in 
their performance. For Experiment 6, JOLs and study time allocation showed no differences 
between concrete word pairs and abstract word pairs, replicating the finding from Experiment 2 
in Chapter 2. 
The accuracy of JOLs were low or even zero in some cases for compound word pairs and 
non-compound word pairs in Experiments 4 and 5. This finding did not change when participants 
were given a second block or feedback, which was expected based on the fact that they did not 
change their ratings between block 1 and 2. Experiment 6 demonstrated the consistent finding 
that delayed-JOLs improve the accuracy of JOLs. Compared to Experiment 2 in Chapter 2 where 
immediate-JOLs for concrete word pairs had no correlation to test performance (M = .074, SD = 
.45), the delayed-JOLs for concrete word pairs had moderate correlation to test performance (M 
= .45, SD = .38). However, the accuracy of immediate- and delayed-JOLs remained the same for 
abstract word pairs. 
CJs demonstrated a more predictable pattern where compound word pairs had higher CJs 
than non-compound word pairs and concrete word pairs had higher CJs than abstract word pairs. 
On the other hand, response latencies showed no differences across any of the stimulus 
manipulations, however they were generally faster when a response was correct than incorrect 
(Experiments 4 and 5). This pattern may have been a result of participants once again showing a 
discrepancy between intact and rearranged pairs at test. The fast response latencies for intact 
pairs was reflected by the high accuracy of CJs which did not change with a second block or 
feedback. For rearranged pairs there was a clear pattern where compound word pairs had close to 





correlation to test performance. This pattern did not change with an addition of a second block or 
feedback. 
Chapter 3 showed that overall performance on an associative recognition test and 
metacognitive behavior remained the same when participants were given experience with the 
task and when they were given feedback on their performance. While these manipulations failed 
to changed participants study behavior, the addition of delayed-JOLs did result in improved 
accuracy for JOLs for concrete word pairs. The implication of the findings from all 6 






Chapter 4: General Discussion 
This final chapter will summarize the main findings from all 6 experiments presented in 
Chapters 2 and 3, then the findings will be discussed in terms of theoretical significance, 
followed by practical applications to this research, and finally a conclusion that can be made 
from this dissertation. The main purpose of this dissertation was to examine associative 
recognition memory from a metacognitive framework. In Chapter 1, the main concepts of 
metacognition and associative memory were introduced in order to establish a purpose for the set 
of 6 experiments carried out, these concepts included: metacognition, metamemory, 
metacognitive measures, associative information, and recognition. The main research question 
was whether people display the same metacognitive behaviors when using associative memory 
than when using item memory. Chapters 2 and 3 used different approaches to answering this 
question but both provided promising ideas that can help our understanding of metamemory for 
associative recognition memory. 
In Chapter 2, we presented three experiments that examined whether three types of 
metacognitive measures changed when the outcome of an associative recognition memory task 
was different.  Experiment 1 replicated the concordant Compound Word effect (Ahmad & 
Hockley, 2014), where compound word pairs had equal discriminability to non-compound word 
pairs, but had higher hit rates and higher false alarm rates. Experiment 2 replicated the mirror 
effect found for concrete and abstract word pairs (Glanzer & Adams, 1985), where concrete 
word pairs had higher hit rates, lower false alarm, and better discriminability than abstract word 
pairs. Finally, in Experiment 3 we found another mirror effect where picture pairs had higher hit 
rates, lower false alarm rates, and better discriminability than unrelated word pairs. Based on 





2008) we expected to find that picture pairs had better hit rates but equal false alarm rates 
compared to unrelated word pairs, this would have provided three unique set of results in which 
to compare our metacognitive measures. Regardless, these three experiments still used different 
sets of stimuli and provided at least two unique pattern of results from the associative recognition 
memory tests.  
With the differences found in the performance on the associative recognition test for the 
first three experiments, the question remained of whether there would be differences displayed 
by the metacognitive measures. In terms of the self-report ratings, JOLs and CJs produced a 
pattern of results mostly consistent with what has been found in the metamemory literature. The 
relatedness of word pairs was highly influential when making either a JOL or CJ, where higher 
related word pairs were given higher ratings compared to lower related word pairs. 
Unexpectedly, neither concreteness nor the distinctiveness of pictures pairs influenced JOLs and 
only concreteness had an effect on CJs. This was surprising when considering that participants 
had better discriminability for concrete word pairs and picture pairs than abstract word pairs and 
unrelated word pairs, respectively, which would justify higher confidence at study or at test for 
these items; this finding will be discussed further in the metacognitive measures section. We did 
find that immediate-JOLs were consistently poor indicators of future performance, as they 
always had a low correlation to test performance for all stimuli across all three experiments. In 
contrast, CJs consistently showed a high correlation between intact pairs and test performance, 
which suggests participants are able to accurately judge their performance on these items. 
However, the lowest correlations with test performance were between CJs and rearranged pairs. 





explained by the dual process approach to associative recognition memory and will be discussed 
further in a later section. 
Study time allocation reflected a compatible pattern of results to JOLs, where higher 
confidence in a pair type corresponded with less study time. This was, however, only true for 
Experiment 1, where higher related word pairs were studied less than lower related word pairs. 
In Experiments 2 and 3 where no differences in JOLs were found, there was also no differences 
in study time allocation. This was partially expected, as study time allocation and JOLs are 
known to be inversely related (for review see Son & Metcalfe, 2000). If JOLs are considered an 
indicator of item difficulty then participants considered unrelated word pairs more difficult than 
related word pairs, concrete word pairs as equally difficult as abstract word pairs, and picture 
pairs as equally difficult as unrelated word pairs. Participants then allocated more study time to 
items deemed more difficult which is in line with the discrepancy reduction model (Dunlosky & 
Hertzog, 1998) and the region of proximal learning model (Metcalfe, 2002). 
Response latencies were expected to correspond with CJs, just as study time allocation 
corresponded with JOLs, however this was not entirely the case. The only difference in response 
latencies was between concrete and abstract pairs, where concrete word pairs had shorter 
latencies than abstract word pairs. Although, we did find that participants had reliably shorter 
response latencies following a hit, which corresponds to their high confidence for intact items. 
Response latencies for false alarms, correct rejections, and misses showed no reliable pattern of 
results among all three experiments. The potential significance of our findings on study time 
allocation and response latencies with respect to overall metacognitive behavior will be 





In Chapter 3, the focus of the experiments shifted away from differences in the 
associative memory test and more towards differences in the metacognitive measures. The goal 
was to manipulate the procedure of the experiments in order to alter the participants study 
behavior or responses at test. In Experiments 4 and 5 a second study-test block was introduced in 
order to give participants an opportunity to learn from previous experience, either from the task 
itself or from their performance on the task. Experiment 5 specifically examined the latter, 
because on the first test participants were given corrective feedback after each response. In 
addition, Experiments 4 and 5 were based on Experiment 1 and ended up replicating the results 
for that experiment. The results for these two experiments can be summarized succinctly because 
the additional study-test block and feedback had no effect on any of the metacognitive measures 
or on the outcome of the memory tests. 
The final manipulation carried out in Experiment 6 was the substitution of immediate 
JOLs for delayed-JOLs, which proved significant. Rather than participants providing a JOL after 
studying a single pair, they provided a JOL once all pairs had been studied ensuring a delay 
between when a pair was studied and when it’s corresponding JOL was given. Delayed-JOLs 
have been found to be more accurately related to memory performance (Nelson & Dunlosky, 
1991) than immediate JOLs. While we did not find any difference between immediate JOLs and 
delayed-JOLs for abstract word pairs, we did find a difference for concrete word pairs. There 
was a considerable increase in accuracy for delayed-JOLs for concrete word pairs compared to 
immediate JOLs. This finding demonstrates that at least one factor that positively affects 
metacognitive behavior for item memory, similarly affects metacognitive behavior for 







This section will provide some perspective on how the findings from all the 
metacognitive measures we used has added to our general understanding of metacognition. One 
of the goals of this dissertation was to examine the metacognitive behavior that is used when 
participants perform an associative recognition memory task. For that reason we chose 
metacognitive measures that encompassed all three stages of the common memory model, which 
is outlined in the Nelson and Narens’ (1990) framework. During acquisition we included JOLs 
(during learning), study time allocation/termination of study (during learning); during retention 
we had delayed-JOLs; during retrieval we had confidence judgments (after response output), and 
response latencies (termination of memory search). The following subsections will discuss each 
metacognitive measure individually. 
Judgments of Learning 
As one of the most commonly implemented metacognitive judgments for memory 
research, JOLs have been studied under many conditions. They are typically measured item-by-
item (e.g., Soderstrom & McCabe, 2011) or as global ratings (e.g., a single JOL for each 
category of items; Tauber et al., 2019) and are self-reported judgments of the likelihood that an 
item will be remembered at some point in the future. Based on previous findings, we know JOLs 
are highly sensitive to stimulus manipulations. For instance, participants gave higher JOLs for 
words with high frequency compared to low frequency words (for a review see Fiacconi & 
Dollois, 2020) and they gave higher JOLs for words in large font than in small font (Rhodes & 
Castel, 2008). More importantly for our experiments, participants gave higher JOLs for concrete 
words than abstract words (Witherby & Tauber, 2017), and they gave higher JOLs for related 





expected that all of the immediate JOLs implemented in 5 of our experiments would show 
differences between the different types of stimuli. Surprisingly, we only found a difference in 
JOLs for related and unrelated word pairs. According to cue-utilization theory (Koriat, 1997), the 
differences in stimuli are an intrinsic cue which should have affected how participants based 
their JOLs, however this would not be the case if a conflicting mnemonic cue was used by the 
participants. For instance, if participants had the belief that there is no difference between 
studying concrete word pairs and abstract word pairs, then they would not treat those two types 
of pairs differently. 
This conclusion is unlikely because Witherby and Tauber (2017) examined the effect of 
concreteness on JOLs over six experiments and found a consistent effect where concrete words 
were given higher JOLs than abstract words. Moreover, they concluded that this effect was due 
to a belief by the participants that concrete words would be more likely to be remembered than 
abstract words. The difference in Witherby and Tauber’s study and the experiments carried out 
for this dissertation was that word pairs were used not single words. One possibility that could 
explain these different findings is that when participants study word pairs they do not perceive a 
benefit of concreteness for generating or retaining associative information. Another possibility is 
that participants may believe that the strategy they used to generate an association between two 
items was equally as effective for concrete pairs as it was for abstract pairs. Future studies could 
examine participants’ strategy choice more closely, which may give insight into determining 
whether participants’ JOLs for word pairs with varying levels of concreteness are influenced by 
beliefs about the cues or participants’ mnemonic abilities. 
While it was unexpected that concreteness had no effect on JOLs for word pairs, it was 





should be noted, however, there is much less known about how participants rate their memory 
for pictures and no study as far as I am aware has compared JOLs for pictures (or picture pairs) 
and words (or word pairs). A few studies have found that specific properties of pictures influence 
JOL ratings, such as emotional valence (Hourihan & Bursey, 2017), stimulus size (Undorf et al., 
2017), and color (Undorf & Broder, 2021). It has also been established that there is a picture 
superiority effect for associative recognition memory (Hockley, 2008) where picture pairs have 
higher hit rates, equal or lower false alarm rates, and better discriminability than unrelated word 
pairs. Therefore, the finding that JOLs were the same for picture pairs and unrelated word pairs 
suggests that participants failed to perceive the benefit of pictures over words. Similar to 
concreteness, this finding may be explained by an erroneous belief that learning associative 
information for pictures is the same as learning associative information for words. While 
researchers have not been able to explain why the picture superiority effect occurs, our findings 
presents another question which is why participants seem unaware of the benefit of pictures over 
words. 
Mean JOL ratings represent a general notion of how confident participants are in 
remembering study material. This type of measure provides insight on the factors that influence 
study behavior or fail to have an effect. An alternative inference that metacognitive researchers 
make is the correlation between a JOL rating and its corresponding outcome at test, which is 
considered a measure of resolution, or relative accuracy (Fleming & Lau, 2014). Throughout the 
first five experiments we consistently found that an item’s immediate JOL had a low correlation 
to its corresponding outcome at test. This is in line with previous work on immediate JOLs 
where relative accuracy, as measured by gamma correlation, are at best moderate (Rhodes & 





performance for word pairs of varying levels of relatedness, levels of concreteness, and picture 
pairs versus word pairs, the low accuracy of immediate JOLs was not surprising. Overall, the set 
of results we obtained, along with previous studies, suggests that participants fail to correctly 
assess study cues when making immediate JOLs.  
Before discussing the reason why this might occur, I will first explain the results of the 
delayed-JOL measure implemented in Experiment 6. Delayed-JOLs have been widely found to 
increase the relative accuracy of JOL ratings (for review see Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). The 
delayed-JOL effect had previously been reported with recall tests of paired associates, where a 
delayed-JOL was prompted using only the cue (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). When participants 
are provided a cue they can use their familiarity or recollection of the cue as a basis for their 
JOLs, or they can attempt to retrieve the target and base their JOL on their ability to retrieve or 
not retrieve the target (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). Because of the nature of the associative 
recognition test, the procedure for prompting delayed-JOLs can change from presenting only the 
cue to presenting both the cue and the target (i.e., both words in a pair), which was the case for 
Experiment 6. Therefore, neither cue-familiarity nor target retrievability would explain the 
improvements in the accuracy for delayed-JOLs.  
Some researchers (e.g., Spellman & Bjork, 1992) consider the delayed-JOL effect a result 
of additional study practice, similar to testing effects (Dunlosky et al., 2013). One finding that 
would support this idea is if JOLs, or other metacognitive judgments, provided a benefit to recall 
or recognition performance. Our results showed that delayed-JOLs did not affect performance on 
the associative recognition test; however, there have been studies that found that JOLs do affect 
recall (Serra & Dunlosky, 2005). If delayed-JOLs are not simply a reflection of additional study 





JOLs are based on short-term memory (STM), while delayed-JOLs are based on long-term 
memory (LTM). This was the original explanation proposed by Nelson and Dunlosky (1991) 
when they first introduced delayed-JOLs, and remains the best supported by the data. This is 
exemplified by the finding in Experiment 6 where only the delayed-JOLs for concrete word pairs 
showed improvement, while those for abstract word pairs did not. This makes sense because 
concrete word pairs were in fact easier to recognize than abstract word pairs, as shown in the 
results on the associative recognition test, and therefore LTM is better for concrete word pairs 
than abstract word pairs. It would be of interest for future research to carry on the exploration of 
delayed-JOLs for associative memory in order to gain more insight into what factors improve 
JOL accuracy. 
Confidence Judgments 
As oppose to JOLs, which are measured during study and correspond to the acquisition 
process of memory, CJs are measured at test and correspond to the retrieval process of memory. 
Throughout all of our experiments there were a number of results regarding CJs that provide 
potential insight into the retrieval process for associative recognition memory. First, stimulus 
manipulation had an inconsistent effect on mean CJs. In terms of relatedness, participants only 
had an increase in confidence for high strength word pairs compared to compound word pairs, 
low strength word pairs, and unrelated word pairs. The fact that compound word pairs were 
given the same CJs as low strength word pairs and unrelated word pairs is surprising, given that 
previous research has found effects of relatedness on JOLs (Mueller et al., 2013). One possible 
explanation for these results is that only during the test did participants notice the difficulty of 
discriminating between old and new compound word pairs which caused their confidence to 





pairs at test, according to dual-process theory compound word pairs would suffer from an 
increased reliance on familiarity which is less accurate than recollection (Ahmad & Hockley, 
2014). It follows that CJs based on familiarity would be lower than CJs based on recollection. 
This would explain why participants’ confidence in remembering compound word pairs 
seemingly decrease from study to test. The relation between CJs and associative recognition 
memory will be considered more closely in the next section. 
The other two stimulus manipulations resulted in two opposing pattern of results. For the 
first case, participants were more confident in concrete word pairs than abstract word pairs. This 
corresponds well with test performance in which concrete word pairs had better discriminability 
than abstract word pairs. However, for the second case participants were equally confident in 
picture pairs and unrelated word pairs. This did not match their test performance where picture 
pairs had better discriminability than unrelated word pairs. These results suggest certain stimuli 
can affect performance without affecting confidence. The increased confidence for concrete 
word pairs may be explained by generalizing the finding that participants believe that concrete 
words are easier to remember than abstract words (Witherby & Tauber, 2017) to the idea that 
participants consider concrete items easier to remember than abstract items. A way to confirm 
this notion would be by replicating Witherby and Tauber’s (2017) study but with word pairs to 
see if beliefs about concreteness are the same for word pairs as they are for single words. At 
present, it remains unclear why concreteness affects metacognitive judgments at study differently 
than metacognitive judgments at test. Other questions remain as well, such as why the benefit of 
pictures over words had no effect on JOLs or CJs? At the moment, we can only conclude that 





One of the predictions for CJs was that they would be greater for item types that had 
better performance in terms of discriminability, for instance, picture pairs should have higher CJs 
than unrelated word pairs. This prediction was based on the assumption that participants can 
accurately assess when their responses are correct or incorrect. What we found is that the 
accuracy of CJs was actually dependent on the type of test item, where intact pairs showed very 
high accuracy and rearranged pairs showed very low accuracy. This finding corresponds to the 
pattern of results for mean CJs, which were shown to be consistent throughout all six 
experiments. For intact pairs participants gave the highest CJs following a hit, and the lowest CJs 
following a miss, which demonstrate good metacognitive monitoring. Whereas for rearranged 
pairs, participants CJs were no different following a false alarm than following a correct 
rejection, which demonstrates poor metacognitive monitoring.  
This finding is in line with the dual-process theory of recognition memory, where 
participants use familiarity as a fast initial method of responding to a test pair but they need to 
use a slower, more accurate method of retrieving specific details of a previous event in order to 
reject novel items that may seem familiar (Rotello & Heit, 2000). Since intact trials are 
composed of two items which were previously paired together during study, familiarity with 
either one item, both, or the association is equally sufficient to recognize that trial as old or new. 
The low accuracy of CJs for rearranged trials would suggest that participants failed to use a 
recall-to-reject process, because if they did then you would expect a much greater degree of 
accuracy between their CJs and their performance on the test. An interesting idea that might 
change the accuracy of CJs is if participants’ motivation to use recall-to-reject was increased, for 






Reaction Time Measures 
The two reaction time measures, included in all six experiments, are similar to JOLs and 
CJs in terms of relying on different processes. During study we looked at participants’ reaction 
times in order to determine whether they allocate study time differently depending on the type of 
stimuli. We found that participants allocated more study time to unrelated word pairs compared 
to compound word pairs, this corresponds to the pattern of results for JOLs. As was mentioned in 
the previous section on JOLs, self-paced study time is considered to be based on fluency, either 
processing or encoding (Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005), where items that take longer to study are 
considered more difficult to learn and less likely to be remembered. So, our findings replicated 
previous results from cued-recall studies (e.g., Koriat et al., 2006) where an increase in study 
time corresponds with a decrease in confidence. We did not find this for low strength word pairs, 
which were studied for the same amount of time as compound word pairs and high strength word 
pairs, but were given lower JOLs, however there was a non-significant trend where low strength 
word pairs were given more study time. 
The results of study time allocation were surprising for both concrete pairs versus 
abstract pairs and picture pairs versus word pairs. There were no difference in study time 
between concrete word pairs and abstract word pairs, nor was there a difference between picture 
pairs and unrelated word pairs. Considering test performance, it was expected that participants 
would allocate more study time to abstract word pairs and unrelated word pairs since they had 
more difficulty with these items. These results do, however, correspond to the pattern of results 
for JOLs, where there were also no differences between pair types. In general, these 
corresponding pattern of results for study time and JOLs supports the idea that these measures 





One way to examine this idea further would be to explore participants’ strategy choice. 
Participants might believe that the associative information formed for concrete word pairs and 
picture pairs is different than the item information, in which case their study strategy should 
reflect a difference for how they study single items and pairs of items. It would also be expected 
that participants would use the same strategy for concrete word pairs as abstract word pairs and 
for picture pairs as unrelated word pairs. Based on the current results, it seems that participants 
study these word pair types the same way. 
For the test phase we looked at participants’ reaction times in order to determine what 
conditions would lead to faster or slower responding. We only found differences in response 
latencies for concrete and abstract word pairs, where concrete word pairs had shorter latencies 
than abstract word pairs. This particular finding corresponds well with the pattern of results for 
CJs where concrete word pairs were given higher CJs than abstract word pairs. Because response 
latencies are considered a measure of retrieval fluency (Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005) then these 
results would suggest that higher CJs are given for items that are retrieved quickly. This also 
corresponds well to our results for picture pairs versus unrelated word pairs, which had no 
differences in response latencies and no differences in CJs. However, we found that high strength 
word pairs were given higher CJs than either compound word pairs or low strength pairs, but 
there were no differences in response latencies between these three pair types. These results 
suggest that there may be other factors, besides retrieval fluency, that are contributing to CJs. 
The next section will discuss why making CJs for associative recognition tasks seems to differ 







Associative Recognition Memory from a Metacognitive Perspective 
This section will address the main purpose of this dissertation, which was to gain a better 
understanding of metamemory, specifically, in relation to associative recognition memory. 
Considering the differences between recognition and recall (Humphreys, 1976), as well as 
associative memory and item memory (Buchler et al., 2008; Cohn & Moscovitch, 2007), the 
results from the six experiments presented in Chapters 2 and 3 provide novel findings for 
metamemory for associative recognition. Three topics will be addressed: what findings were 
unique to our paradigm, how is metamemory for item information different than associative 
information, and what do our results suggest about the use of dual processes in associative 
recognition memory. 
The main difference with our experiments and previous research on paired-associates is 
that we used a recognition test with intact and rearranged pairs, which is considered a relatively 
pure test of associative memory (Humphreys, 1976) as opposed to, for instance, cued recall. This 
recognition test provides an opportunity to examine dual process theory, because rearranged 
pairs cannot be solely recognized using item familiarity because both items in a rearranged pair 
had previously been studied. Only a few studies have examined metacognitive judgments with an 
associative recognition test, however the primary focus of those studies was to determine the 
influence of metacognition on future study behavior for older and younger adults (Hertzog et al., 
2013; Hines et al., 2009; Hines et al., 2015). Due to procedural differences only two findings are 
comparable between these previous studies and our experiments. First, we replicated the finding 
that immediate JOLs have low relative accuracy in predicting performance on an associative 
recognition memory test. Second, we found the same discrepancy in CJs for intact and 





pairs and had a low correlation with response accuracy for rearranged trials. The other pattern of 
results we found for JOLs, study time allocation, CJs, and response latencies have not been 
previously reported.  
In terms of study measures, we found that both JOLs and study time allocation are 
influenced by encoding fluency, but it is not the only factor. Both cue-utilization theory (Koriat, 
1997) and analytic-processing (AP) theory (Mueller et al., 2016) propose that participants’ 
beliefs in how a cue will affect their memory plays an important role in determining their 
monitoring accuracy during study. Based on our results, it seems that participants have different 
beliefs on how concreteness, for example, affects item memory versus associative memory but 
their beliefs on how relatedness is the same for item versus associative memory. Alternatively, 
processing fluency can also explain our results because differences in study time allocation, 
which serve as a measure of encoding fluency, corresponded to differences in JOLs. Future 
studies could determine which explanation has more validity by either eliminating the benefit of 
processing fluency during study or by examining participants’ beliefs about how stimulus 
characteristics will affect their memory for associations. 
The results for the test measures poses some questions for the currently accepted 
explanations for CJs. The most frequent explanation for the basis of CJs is that they use retrieval 
fluency, both the accessibility of a target item and the latency for when a target is retrieved 
(Dougherty et al., 2005). For an associate recognition paradigm the influence of retrieval fluency 
is reduced to just the latency of when an item pair was recognized. As a measure of retrieval 
fluency, we looked at response latencies and found that for some cases, like concreteness, 
retrieval fluency corresponded with CJs where participants had higher confidence when response 





word pairs, where participants had higher confidence for these pairs but there were no 
differences in response latencies. It is likely that for stimuli with different levels of relatedness, 
like compound word pairs and non-compound word pairs, participants’ confidence was driven by 
whether the test pair was old or new. 
The differences in CJs for related pairs versus unrelated pairs might be because of 
participants’ overreliance on familiarity as a process for identifying both old and new pairs at 
test. The likelihood of participants using familiarity during the associative recognition test is 
supported by two findings. First, the concordant effects present in three of our experiments 
demonstrated that an increase in hits for highly related word pairs was accompanied by an 
increase in false alarms. The increased familiarity of highly related word pairs is only beneficial 
for old pair types, where recognition of either item in the pair can be used to make a correct 
response. Familiarity is unreliable for new pairs because both items have a degree of familiarity. 
Then, if participants rely on familiarity we would expect that they would perform better on old 
pairs and perform worse on new pairs, which is what we found for compound word pairs.  
The second result that suggest participants relied on familiarity is their criterion 
placements. A participant’s criterion displays their level of bias towards responding to any test 
pair as old. Highly related word pairs consistently showed a liberal bias which means 
participants overestimated the proportion of old related word pairs at test because they seemed 
familiar. The increase reliance on familiarity also explains why participants were more confident 
in their responses for related word pairs compared to unrelated word pairs. Additionally, if 
participants use a recollection process for rearranged pairs, then we would expect their response 





familiarity process, but this was not what we found. Ultimately, the overall pattern of results for 
relatedness supports the dual process theory of associative recognition memory. 
The experiments in Chapter 3 were then designed to improve metacognitive monitoring 
with changes in the procedure. Experiment 4 and 5 both failed to achieve this, as neither adding a 
second study-test block nor providing feedback during the test phase resulted in any meaningful 
changes in study behavior or the pattern of results on the associative recognition tests. Previous 
studies have shown that if participants are provided with a second learning opportunity with a 
second study-test block and the stimuli remain the same, then participants show changes in JOLs, 
CJs, and study time (Hertzog et al., 2013; Hines et al., 2015). However, because we used 
different stimuli for the second study-test block participants could only learn from their 
experience with the task and with feedback on a previously similar test. This suggests that in this 
case participants are not transferring what they learned from past experiences to a new but 
similar situation. Future studies might be able to examine this finding more closely by making 
the similarities between the two study-test blocks more explicitly known to the participants (e.g., 
pointing out the differences in performance between two different word pair types). 
The results for Experiments 4 and 5 regarding experience and feedback both found major 
null effects, however there were also numerous other null effects outlined in the other 
experiments for study time, JOLs, CJs, and response latencies. One potential limitation to this 
research is that there was not enough power to find some of these effects. For instance, in 
Experiment 4 of Witherby and Tauber (2017) there was a small effect of concreteness on JOLs 
where JOLs were higher for concrete words compared to abstract words (d = .18). We ran a 
power analysis to estimate how large a sample size would be needed to obtain such a small effect 





that we had enough power to detect significant effects for all of our recognition memory 
manipulations as well as numerous metamemory measures. Part of the issue with self-reported 
metamemory ratings is the large individual variability in responses (Kantner & Dobbins, 2019), 
this makes it difficult to detect potential group differences for these measures. Regardless, future 
studies should examine the issue of power and sample sizes more closely when using these types 
of measures.  
Applications of Research 
Metacognitive research has many real world applications, particularly for students, 
because it often reveals a misconception between how people perceive their own learning and 
how they actually learn. Our finding that immediate JOLs are quite inaccurate serves as a prime 
example of a situation where people are unable to monitor their learning progress. However, the 
findings from metacognitive research has helped teaching instructors to better understand why 
students sometimes develop ineffective study behaviors. In this section I will review some of the 
ways our research can be applied to students’ learning behavior, including: when they terminate 
study, how their confidence fluctuates, and how they can improve their metacognitive accuracy. 
When participants initially engage with the study material presented during the first phase 
of an experiment they have to determine the parameters of the task. Some parameters may be 
given to them with instructions, such as how many items they need to learn to pass the 
experiment, other parameters need to be determined by the participant, such as determining the 
difficulty of each item. Ultimately, these parameters help the participant know when to terminate 
their study of each item. What we found is that participants take into account the characteristics 
of the study material but are not able to determine how different characteristics will affect their 





when in reality they lead to high rates of false alarms. Similarly, they thought concrete word 
pairs were equally difficult to learn as abstract word pairs, when concrete word pairs are actually 
easier to discriminate than abstract word pairs. Even when participants studied picture pairs and 
unrelated word pairs, which are quite noticeably different, they studied them the same way even 
though picture pairs are much easier to discriminate than word pairs. One takeaway from this 
research for instructors is that students have difficulty knowing what will affect their learning 
even if they are able to notice differences in the study material. 
A large portion of metacognitive research looks directly at participants’ confidence levels 
through self-reported ratings. In our research we looked at JOLs and CJs, but there are many 
other rating measures that similarly gauge participants’ confidence in their own learning (e.g., 
Feeling-of-knowing judgments; Chua & Solinger, 2015). The purpose of this line of research is 
to find out the factors that affect participants’ confidence but perhaps do not affect their actual 
learning. One factor that was just described is the characteristics of the study material, which 
differentially affect confidence and performance. Another factor is the different time points of 
the learning processes. When participants were studying they were not able to optimize their 
learning because they did not understand how the differences in the study material would affect 
them. During the test participants failed to evaluate the difficulty of identifying new rearranged 
pairs, especially for word pairs that were highly related like compound word pairs. Although 
participants did indicate that they had lower confidence when responding to rearranged pairs, 
they did not change the way they handled these pairs in comparison with intact pairs. Regardless 
of the reason for this happening, it indicates that participants will fail to adapt their behavior 





In terms of how the accuracy of students’ metacognitive judgments can be improved we 
have a number of suggestions based on our findings. First, we must point out two situations that 
do not seem to affect metacognitive behavior. We first examined whether the lack of experience 
with an associative recognition memory task was causing problems for the participants. We 
found that giving participants experience with the task, by including another study-test block, did 
not change any of the metacognitive measures or performance. Therefore, we concluded that 
experience with the task by itself is not enough to change participants learning behavior. We then 
provided participants with feedback on whether their responses on the test were correct or 
incorrect, as well as the inclusion of a second study-test block. Ultimately, this still failed to have 
an effect on any of our measures, which once again suggests a difficulty for participant in 
adapting their study behavior on their own. 
The last attempt we made to improve metacognitive accuracy did work, at least partially. 
When asked to give delayed-JOLs for abstract word pairs, there was an increase in relative 
accuracy compared to when participants were asked to give immediate-JOLs. It has been 
speculated that delayed-JOLs are a result of participants changing the basis of their JOLs from 
STM to LTM (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). That would only partially explain our findings, 
because we did not see improved accuracy for delayed-JOLs for concrete word pairs which were 
given under the same conditions as delayed-JOLs for abstract word pairs. An alternative 
explanation is that metacognitive judgments at study are more accurate when they are taken 
under conditions that resemble the conditions at test (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1997). In this case, the 
prompt for delayed-JOLs are quite similar to the prompt at test, where previously studied word 
pairs are presented again after some time had passed. The problem still remains that abstract 





different results. Therefore, if we want to recommend to students that a useful strategy to judge 
their learning is to wait for a delay after initially learning, then we need to further explore the 
conditions where this strategy produces beneficial results. 
Conclusion 
Human memory is a fundamental, but complex, system that allows people to store and 
retrieve information from a past experience. A developing area of research on metamemory 
explores the interaction between higher order functions, such as reasoning and introspection, and 
memory. The research presented in this dissertation was done in order to better understand the 
relation between metacognition and associative recognition memory. While previous research 
had been done on the metacognitive measures we employed (JOLs, CJs, study time allocation, 
and response latencies), there were not many studies that used these measures with an associative 
recognition task. We replicated three findings for associative memory: first, a concordant effect 
for compound word pairs, second a mirror effect for concreteness, and third a mirror effect for 
picture pairs versus word pairs. When we examined the metacognitive measures under these 
three different patterns of results, we found that participants struggled to correctly use cues, such 
as stimulus characteristics, to their advantage when judging their performance. They 
overestimated the usefulness of some factors, like the level of relatedness between two pairs, 
while underestimating other factors, like the benefit of pictures over words. Our attempts to 
improve metacognitive accuracy or correct study behavior was only partially successful when we 
introduced delayed-JOLs instead of immediate JOLs. However, this does suggest that strategies 
that have been previously found to improve metacognitive accuracy for other types of memory 
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List of Abbreviations 
JOLs   Judgments of Learning 
CJs Confidence Judgments (sometimes referred to as RCJs in the literature for 
Retrospective Confidence Judgments) 
EOLs  Ease-of-Learning Judgments 
WF  Word Frequency 
AP-Theory Analytic-Processing Theory 
FOK  Feeling-of-Knowing Judgments 
MPT  Memory for Past Tests 
HR  Hit Rate 
FAR  False Alarm Rate 
CW  Compound Word 
NCW  Non-Compound Word 
STM  Short-Term Memory 









Stimuli for Experiment 1 
Study list 
Compound word pairs High strength word pairs Low strength word pairs 
candle wax below above brother sibling 
slap stick beneath under stranger relative 
eye sight autumn fall crisp sharp 
whip lash rake leaves mouth dry 
finger tip author writer disgrace upset 
thumb nail read book deny regret 
grape vine croak frog garden pretty 
passion fruit live die spaghetti tomato 
hair brush cigar smoke idea mind 
crew cut cigarette lighter request suggestion 
heart break cent money loud sound 
drum beat copper penny lonely silence 
hedge row dozen twelve movie video 
wart hog bacon eggs stare watch 
moon shine decade ten pain pleasure 
lime light month year body head 
neck tie granite stone power volt 
shoe lace boulder rock elegant prestige 
nut cracker near close scenery nice 
clam shell distant far theater stage 





moth ball jacket coat question test 
steam roller pail bucket theme subject 
tug boat pool water number name 
pass port estimate guess stink sewer 
band wagon here there perish burn 
jail bird insane crazy opinion bad 
blow torch lost found hat box 
hail storm pencil pen ease complex 
bull fight pony horse enrage calm 
stove pipe spades cards cloth clean 
tea cup spoiled rotten canvas green 
sheep dog uncle aunt appear become 
wall flower university college absurd funny 
store keep slumber party throw move 
hen house rest sleep violent hit 
tooth paste tote bag time slow 
ear ache haul carry list schedule 
 
Test list 
Compound word pairs High strength word pairs Low strength word pairs 
 
Rearranged word pairs 
 
candle stick below under brother relative 
eye lash autumn leaves crisp dry 
finger nail author book disgrace regret 





hair cut cigar cigarette idea suggestion 
heart beat cent penny loud silence 
hedge hog dozen eggs movie watch 
moon light decade year pain head 
neck lace granite rock power prestige 
nut shell near far scenery stage 
snow ball mink coat student test 
steam boat pail water theme name 
 
Intact word pairs 
 
pass port estimate guess stink sewer 
band wagon here there perish burn 
jail bird insane crazy opinion bad 
blow torch lost found hat box 
hail storm pencil pen ease complex 
bull fight pony horse enrage calm 
stove pipe spades cards cloth clean 
tea cup spoiled rotten canvas green 
sheep dog uncle aunt appear become 
wall flower university college absurd funny 
store keep slumber party throw move 









Stimuli for Experiments 2 and 6 
Study list 
Abstract word pairs Concrete word pairs 
failure goddess olive squirrel 
malice impulse herring pony 
assent attempt pillow orange 
perry forecast stomach rocket 
nonsense mercy pliers penny 
extreme unrest cereal tiger 
outset surprise bedroom skylark 
instance outcome turtle kettle 
motive panic liquor puppy 
devil torment candy cedar 
fetish paean kennel mackerel 
neglect hatred basket tulip 
beauty gallant ceiling ribbon 
duty glory chestnut cabbage 
delight defence spider piano 
nadir excise indian sugar 
deceit safety saddle jersey 
context wisdom canoe hatchet 
hygiene merit forearm jacket 
pique lament whiskey cotton 
zero appeal cider walnut 
craven frenzy robin dentist 





dogma upkeep mirror bagpipe 
courage mister sofa belly 
neuter coulomb bracelet necklace 
tribute parry blanket gravy 
horror stoic rabbit soda 
dais virtue tortoise cherry 
hazard danger lily garlic 
pardon demon walrus pickle 
heaven distress rifle eagle 
forfeit terror cattle pencil 
escape recall elbow pigeon 
debut triumph lion ankle 
conquest honour lantern helmet 
content revenge butter balloon 
rating concept puddle trumpet 
upright tenure lemon carrot 
success upset liver coffee 
anger disgrace pedal manure 
excuse folly otter cannon 
envy concert basin chicken 
aspect transfer onion needle 










Abstract word pairs Concrete word pairs 
    
Rearranged word pairs 
    
failure axiom olive sugar 
malice frenzy herring soda 
assent mister pillow hatchet 
perry danger stomach bagpipe 
nonsense wisdom pliers belly 
extreme merit cereal button 
outset safety bedroom cherry 
instance stoic turtle cotton 
motive coulomb liquor garlic 
devil excise candy gravy 
fetish upkeep kennel dentist 
neglect virtue basket jacket 
beauty appeal ceiling necklace 
duty parry chestnut jersey 
delight lament spider walnut 
    
Intact word pairs 
    
pardon demon walrus pickle 
heaven distress rifle eagle 
forfeit terror cattle pencil 
escape recall elbow pigeon 
debut triumph lion ankle 





content revenge butter balloon 
rating concept puddle trumpet 
upright tenure lemon carrot 
success upset liver coffee 
anger disgrace pedal manure 
excuse folly otter cannon 
envy concert basin chicken 
aspect transfer onion needle 
suffix havoc haddock bandage 
 
Stimuli for Experiments 4 and 5 
Study list 




candle wax dare poverty 
slap stick lean peel 
eye sight egg anchor 
whip lash  agency shiny  
finger tip pie sofa 
thumb nail  frame trip  
grape vine capsule fantasy 
passion fruit  filth chicken  
hair brush chew brief 
crew cut  taste basket  





drum beat  mantle insult  
hedge row cash shallow 
wart hog  author mansion  
moon shine worse soft 
lime light  cheese holiday  
neck tie organ monkey 
shoe lace  far whiff  
nut cracker wreck coil 
clam shell  cold foul  
snow plow captain union 
moth ball  satin planet  
steam roller stare role 
tug boat  blue breast  
check list builder ride 
needle point  zipper till  
child birth bribe tragedy 
brother hood  tree chisel  
flag pole vault angel 
friend ship profit wide 
pass port shawl moment  
band wagon  race gang  
jail bird  racquet attack  
snake skin  plant flame  
hail storm  monarch womb  





stove pipe  card slice  
tea cup  corps column  
sheep dog  earn hunger  
wall flower  sheet ring  
store keep  wolf outcome  
hen house  havoc history  
leap frog  liver rural  
sand man  copper brawl  




cross road cabinet brim 
rain bow  system fourth  
earth quake ulcer aisle 
silk worm  parcel vase  
pin stripe loan rich 
pot hole  match science  
saw horse order bargain 
thread mill  rum rose  
star dust broom wonder 
sword fish  cider text  
stock yard utter raise 
pawn broker  oil jelly  
sun set ferry speech 
ink spot  branch sponge  





tee shirt  math toy  
foot rest haze graft 
bar stool  none spell  
witch hunt farther growth 
space craft  meek little  
gold finch sail student 
lock smith  canoe economy  
hand shake phone links 
saddle bag  million winter  
war path ham sewer 
fan fare  remark finish  
side kick idle upright 
cat walk  wick over  
head dress many puppy 
gem stone place trout 
sound track wizard collar  
arm pit  locker heat 
lady like  rat poster  
back pack  dream narrow  
law maker  stew factory  
life saver  scotch coral  
bath robe  fault ashamed  
black mail  brave juice  
news letter  rush spear  





book shelf  defence mash  
night mare  ripe smack  
death wish  object hill  
play thing  poll bible  
door step want reward 
 
Test list 





candle stick dare peel 
eye lash egg shiny 
finger nail pie trip 
grape fruit capsule chicken 
hair cut chew basket 
heart beat scene insult 
hedge hog cash mansion 
moon light worse holiday 
neck lace organ whiff 
nut shell wreck foul 
snow ball captain planet 
steam boat stare breast 
check point builder till 
child hood bribe chisel 







pass port shawl moment 
band wagon race gang 
jail bird racquet attack 
snake skin plant flame 
hail storm monarch womb 
bull fight small cannon 
stove pipe card slice 
tea cup corps column 
sheep dog earn hunger 
wall flower sheet ring 
store keep wolf outcome 
hen house havoc history 
leap frog liver rural 
sand man copper brawl 





cross bow cabinet fourth 
earth worm ulcer vase 
pin hole loan science 
saw mill order rose 
star fish broom text 
stock broker utter jelly 
sun spot ferry sponge 





foot stool haze spell 
witch craft farther little 
gold smith sail economy 
hand bag phone winter 
war fare ham finish 
side walk idle over 
head stone many trout 
Intact 
 
sound track wizard collar 
arm pit locker heat 
lady like rat poster 
back pack dream narrow 
law maker stew factory 
life saver scotch coral 
bath robe fault ashamed 
black mail brave juice 
news letter rush spear 
tail spin honesty dawn 
book shelf defence mash 
night mare ripe smack 
death wish object hill 
play thing poll bible 
door step want reward 
 
 
